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I. Introduction
As they retreated in January of 1991, Iraqi troops set fire
to Kuwaiti oil fields, leaving more than 700 wells burning.
They also carried out their threat of befouling the region by
intentionally discharging vast quantities of oil into the Per-
sian Gulf.' Aside from the many epithets that this behavior
1. The environmental consequences of Iraq's actions were widely reported.
See Editorial, War's Enduring Ecological Scars, L.A. Toms, Nov. 8, 1991, at B6;
Youssef M. Ibrabim, Most Oil Fires Are Out inKuwait, But Its Environment Is
Devastated, N.Y. TrmEs, Oct. 19, 1991, at Al; Matthew L. Wald, Kuwaiti Sum-
mer Is Expected to Bring a Foul-Air Disaster, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1991, at A13;
Eric Schmitt, Fouled Region Is Casualty of War, N.Y. TnIEs, Mar. 3, 1991, at
19; Millions of Gallons of Crude Oil Flow Into Persian Gulf from Kuwait, Intl
EnvtL Rep. (BNA), at 37 (Jan. 30, 1991); R.W. Apple Jr., Relentless Tide of Oil
Fouls Shores of Empty Saudi City, N.Y. Tams, Jan. 28, 1991, at Al. See also
Shilpi Gupta, Iraq's Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEo. INr'L
ENvTL. L. Rev. 251 (1993). But see Matthew L. Wald, Just How Bad Is the Air
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prompted, the act was also called ecological or environmental
terrorism.2 Such a label suggests that the environment has
become a pressure point; behavior directed against the envi-
ronment might be seen as a threat to the security of the peo-
ple or political entities associated with that environment.3
The existence of concern for "environmental security" is a re-
flection of the increasingly important role that environmental
management4 plays in modern political relationships. The
primary objective of this article is to explore the concept of
environmental security and to discuss how that concept in-
forms peoples' changing relationship with the Earth.
This is not an easy task because many terms important
to such a discussion are poorly defined. For example, despite
the frequency with which the word is used, it is far from obvi-
ous what is meant by "environment." In current usage, the
term denotes the object of protection, a subfield of law, a type
of education, and an entire movement. In the early days of
the modern environmental movement,5 the focus of environ-
Over Kuwait?, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1991, at E4; Marlise Simons, British Study
Disputes Lengthy Climatic Role for Kuwait Oil Fires, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1991,
at C4.
2. See, e.g., Roy Popkin, Responding to Eco-Terrorism, EPA J., Jul.-Aug.
1991, at 23; Member of U.S. Senate Says Iraqi Leaders Should Be Prosecuted for
Despoiling Gulf, Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 143 (Mar. 11, 1992); Rae Tyson,
Kuwait: Nightmare of Ecological Terrorism, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6E.
3. Increased awareness of the ramifications of large-scale, often inten-
tional, environmental degradation has catalyzed a discourse in the political re-
sults of such occurrences. See, e.g., Thomas Homer-Dixon, Destruction and
Death, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 31, 1993, at E17; Morning Edition: Environment Now
International Issue (National Public Radio radio broadcast, June 1, 1992); Cath-
erine Tinker, Symposium: Environmental Rights and International Peace:
"Environmental Security" in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the Security
Council, 59 TENN. L. REV. 787 (1992); Michael Oppenheimer, From Red Menace
to Green Threat, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 27, 1990, at A27; Michael Colby, WORLD
BANK ENViRONmENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT-THE EvoLUTION OF
PARADIGMS 31 (1990); Flora Lewis, Environment Is Security, N.Y. TIMEs, May
24, 1989, at A31.
4. In this article, "environmental management" refers to a community's
support of a given standard of living through attaining, protecting, enhancing,
and allocating its natural resources. The process of management, therefore,
must include an understanding of the identity of the community. See discus-
sion: infra part II.
5. Many dates vie to be designated the beginning of the modern environ-
mental movement. These include: the publication of Rachel Carson's SILENT
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
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mental protection was the so-called "natural environment."6
That is, environment referred to a vision of a pristine Earth,
presumably before it was spoiled by human activity.
However, there is a more profound understanding of en-
vironment. This is what the delegates to a United Nations
conference in 1972 called the "Human Environment."7 The
report from that conference recognized that: "[b]oth aspects
of... [the human] environment, the natural and the man-
made, are essential to... well-being and to the enjoyment of
basic human rights."8 This concept of environment envisions
humans as both the primary beneficiaries and ultimately the
injured parties of human exploitation of the Earth. Even
though the message is often buried,9 the underlying tenet of
much thoughtful work in environment management is the
recognition that the environment is more than an entity sep-
SPRING in 1962; the adjudication of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); the convening of the Intergovern-
mental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Con-
servation of the Resources of the Biosphere by the United Nations in Paris, in
September of 1968; and the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-90, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370d) (1994). I date the movement generally from its first substantive
policy manifestations in the late 1960s.
6. For example, the declaration of policy at the beginning of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 states that:
[t]he Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity
on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-
density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation,
and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing
further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining envi-
ronmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government
... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony ....
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994).
7. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Corr. 1 (1972).
8. Id. at 11.
9. Such references are often buried in the nonbinding language of a pre-
amble or, occasionally, in a legal instrument. See, e.g., World Charter for Na-
ture, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1982); United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62.122 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(a)-(c) (1994).
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arate from human existence;' o it is a label for a complex rela-
tionship between people and the Earth.
This complexity may be better understood by reviewing
the basis of that relationship. People approach their relation-
ship with the Earth as members of one or more communities,
and the medium of this relationship is often described as
"natural resources." A community" is a group of people
bound together primarily by a common recognition of, and
preference for, the existence and goals' 2 of the community in
question, and, consequently, by the desire for the community
to continue. 13 Those communities that play a large role in
environmental management-primarily political communi-
ties, such as those overseen by political governments-are
the ones most important to this article.
A natural resource is a portion of the Earth that contrib-
utes to the continued existence of a community. That is, nat-
ural resources are Earth-derived substances from which
many aspects of a community's identity are distilled. Such
resources help to define community life by providing the sub-
stance upon which community members base their careers,
interests, and passions.' 4 Without these natural resources
10. Criticizing modern culture, Wendell Berry has recognized that: "[o]nce
we see our place, our part of the world, as surrounding us, we have already
made a profound division between it and ourselves." WENDELL BERRY, THE UN-
SETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE AN AGRicuLTURE 22 (1977).
11. While I am aware that the concept of community comes with much theo-
retical baggage, see, e.g., ROBERT A. NiSBET, THE QUEST FOR CoMMUNrrY (1953);
Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Polit-
ical Theory, WORLD PoLrrcs (Apr. 1977), at 343; I plan to use it loosely, but not
irreverently.
12. The goals of a community might be broad (e.g., a political government's
goal might be to provide security and a certain quality of life) or narrow (e.g., a
local property owners' organization might be a community entirely devoted to
promoting local zoning regulations). An individual might be a member of many
communities, each devoted to the promotion of certain goals.
13. By emphasizing the community's drive for survival, I do not mean to
pass judgment on, or indeed to suggest anything at all about, the appropriate-
ness of the unique traits, history, and immediate goals of a specific community.
The community's identity is important as an aspect of environmental security.
See discussion immediately following and infra section H.B.
14. For example, petroleum is a natural resource for most modern commu-
nities. To some communities, access to arable land is also a natural resource.
Some communities might define the presence of natural vistas or access to wil-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
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the community fails to be the entity that it conceives itself to
be. 15
This definition informs the discussion of environmental
security in at least three ways. First, natural resources are
community specific. While many communities might share a
desire for a given natural resource (e.g., petroleum), the set of
natural resources that reflect a given community's identity
are as unique as that identity. Thus, the reliance on a natu-
ral resource on which I hang this definition is a broad one. To
rely on natural resources only means that lack of access to
the natural resource will be perceived by the community
members as a hardship because the community will fail to
meet the promise of its identity.16
Second, the substances that a community defines as nat-
ural resources may or may not originate within the parame-
ters of a given governing body's control. This definition of
natural resource is, therefore, unlike that of common usage
whereby an earth-derived substance becomes a natural re-
source based on-ownership.17 The definition used here char-
derness to be a natural resource; some others might not value these aspects of
living on the Earth. Certain communities might believe proximity to healthy
forests to be a natural resource; others might not.
15. While there may be natural resources that are widely understood to be
such (e.g., petroleum), this is simply an artifact of a near global desire for the
substance. To the various groups of people that still exist that have no need for
petroleum or its products, that fossil fuel is not a natural resource.
16. A distinction needs to be made here between the community's obligation
to its collective identity and its obligation to individual community members.
Each community's identity includes a conception of the natural resources to
which it must ensure access. This conception probably does not include an obli-
gation to meet the natural resource desires of each community member. For
example, a community might consider lumber a natural resource to which it
ensures access. However, ifa wood carver desires wood from a special tree, the
community is not obligated to ensure access to that wood unless it perceives
itself to be a community that supplies such wood to members who are wood
carvers. If the community does not so define its identity, then the special wood
would not be a natural resource to that community (while it might be a natural
resource to the community of wood carvers that does not seek to ensure access
to the wood).
17. In common usage, a commodity is not a natural resource to the commu-
nity that must purchase it; to that community the substance is but a desired
item that can be purchased, or perhaps even a necessity. Therefore my defini-
tion of natural resources is both broader (i.e., because it includes those sub-
1995] 539
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acterizes substances as natural resources based on the
community's desire to tie its identity to reliance on that sub-
stance. That is not to say that normal economic relationships
fail to hold; the desire of a community to define the substance
as a natural resource almost ensures that the substance has
economic value."'
Third, a governing body's power is tied to natural re-
sources. The governing body is responsible for ensuring nat-
ural resource management to the extent dictated by the
community's identity. Therefore, and especially because ac-
cess to natural resource use might not be entirely controllable
by a governing body,19 the governing body is particularly be-
holden to community members' perception of the commu-
nity's identity. Influencing that perception might be the
governing body's most effective method of maintaining its
legitimacy.20
As was mentioned above, the term environment is often
used to describe some vague notion of the "natural" world
that is somehow better than our own. This usage fails to rec-
ognize that the concept-of environment is a human construct;
it implies a continuing human relationship with the Earth.21
Indeed, the parts of the planet that are the focus of environ-
stances that a community has to import) and more narrow (i.e., because it does
not include community-originating natural substances the presence of which
are unrelated to the community's identity) than the traditional, property-based
definition.
18. Unless the substance is found within the community that defines it as a
natural resource in unlimited quantities, the substance will have economic
value. For example, in many communities around the world breathable air
would be considered a natural resource that does not have a cost. However, as
such air becomes more scarce, it does gain economic value. In the United
States, the cost of implementing environmental regulations, such as the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988), to maintain clean air, effectively transforms
breathable air into a natural resource with economic value.
19. See discussion infra section II1A-1.
20. That is, because the governing body might not be able to always ensure
the proper management of natural resources, it may try to retain its support by
attempting to alter the community's identity, in effect trying to convince the
community members that the "new" identity is one that is more in line with one
defined by the natural resources that the governing body can control. See dis-
cussion infra section IIA.L.b.
21. See also discussion infra section HI.B.I.b. regarding the alienation that
accompanies human dissociation from the Earth.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
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mental management primarily are those parts that are per-
ceived to have some value to humans.22 Following from the
definitions of "community" and "natural resources," the word
"environment" here refers to the totality of natural resources.
The environment of a given community will be community-
specific to that community's natural resources. 23 Stated an-
other way, there is no environment without a community to
so define it; the operation of abiotic and nonhuman biotic
forces on the Earth is best described within the context of
ecology (the subject matter of this science being ecosystems
not environments). Furthermore, because natural resources
are defined, in part, as necessary components of a commu-
nity's identity, a community's environment similarly may be
understood to be an extension of a community's perception of
22. This is not to say that "value" here must be determined in a tradition-
ally economic sense. There is a growing discourse on valuing the environment
which relies on traditional, as well as nontraditional indicators. See, e.g., J.
Baird Callicott, Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction, 14 ENVTL. ETHICS
129 (1991). Indeed, economists have devised a number of methods for valuing
the natural resources that are poorly assessed by market forces. The most eas-
ily understandable group of such methods are those that measure "use value."
The methodologies proposed to assess use value rely on surveys of revealed or
unrevealed preferences; from such information a demand curve can be con-
structed. Examples of these methodologies include: travel cost methodology, see
Robert W. Hahn & James A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review
and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. REG. 233, 261 (1991); hedonic cost methodology, see id.
at 259; various contingent value methodologies, see Robert C. Mitchess & Rich-
ard T. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation
Method, 42 VAND. L. REV. 315-20 (1989); and extrapolation from employment
and other demographic statistics. "Nonuse values" include the values that the
consumer would expend for environmental amenities that she or he has no (or
little) intention of ever using. Examples of nonuse value include: existence
value, see Michael B. Saunders, Valuation and International Regulation of For-
est Ecosystems: Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement, 66 WASH. L. REv. 871,
876 (1991); option value, see Britt Anne Bernheim, Can We Cure Our
Throwaway Habits By Imposing True Social Costs on Disposable Products?, 63
U. CAL. L.R. 953, 963 (1992); and bequest value, see Duane Woodward &
Michael R. Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation Under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 14 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 205 (1990).
23. And, because communities often overlap, so might an individual's envi-
ronments. For example, a person who is a member of a religious community in
a municipal community interacts with at least the two environments associated
with those two communities (i.e., the religious environment and the municipal
environment).
1995] 541
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itself. Complicating things, while the desire for a commu-
nity-specific environment is in part created by a community's
unique experience, this does not mean that the community's
perception of a desirable environment might not shift with
the evolution of the community. 24 Indeed, because the qual-
ity of environment is so tied to communication and values
that might shift rapidly, "environment" must be understood
to be a dynamic concept, a dynamic that might be difficult for
a governing body to anticipate, perceive, and answer.
It follows that environmental management should be un-
derstood to be a euphemism for the range of obligations a
community undertakes to attain, protect, enhance, and allo-
cate its natural resources in accordance with its identity.
That is, environmental management is the part of a commu-
nity's identity that describes a community's commitment to
managing natural resources. Because managing natural re-
sources to a large extent includes ensuring that community
members have access to natural resources, environmental
management might well include the governing body's under-
taking of intercommunity relationships.
An objective of modern society-which I discuss in terms
of communities-is to manage natural resources effectively.25
This article discusses what happens when a community fails
at this task. I posit that when the members of a community
perceive that natural resources are not being managed in a
community-appropriate manner, either the community's
identity or its governance (or both) might be altered by the
resulting social instability.
There is a minimum level of access to environmental
amenities that must be maintained before a community will
feel assured that the governing body is fulfilling its environ-
mental management obligations. If this quality of environ-
ment is not maintained, the community may become
destabilized, and seek to alter the governing circumstances.
This minimum level of access to environmental amenities
24. These shifts may occur passively (e.g., certain shifts accompanying eco-
nomic growth) or they might be active (e.g., when a governing body promotes a
certain standard of living as being appropriate for the community).
25. See discussion infra part II.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
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will be described as a "minimum quality of environment"
(MQE). The definition of MQE will be constructed sequen-
tially throughout this article, ultimately maturing into a sin-
gle fully articulated definition of MQE.
A few things should be clarified about the definition of
MQE. MQE is not meant to be a per capita formula, regard-
less of the fact that it could be stated that way.26 The defini-
tion of MQE is in aggregate form to emphasize that
communities are defined by their identity; the size of the pop-
ulation alone fails to indicate either the heterogeneity of com-
munity members' needs or the community's stage of economic
development. Furthermore, the definition is not only descrip-
tive, it is aspirational. MQE suggests that as a community,
the people collectively expect that certain amenities are part
of their community's social contract. To this extent, MQE
stresses that a community's identity is intricately bound up
in a unique relationship between history and natural re-
source use. Finally, because it indicates a quality of environ-
ment that the members of the community expect, MQE is a
standard that the governing body feels obligated to recognize.
Thus, MQE is a normative standard, often influencing the re-
lationship between community members and the governing
body.2 7
Using this MQE as a guide, a community can establish
and maintain its environmental management policies. A gov-
erning body can succeed in providing environmental security
and stability by acknowledging, and making policy decisions,
26. For example, one could express MQE by dividing the cost of the environ-
mental management necessary to achieve it by the number of members of that
community.
27. The concept of MQE, however, is not claimed to be a wholly conscious or
advertised image of the community-defined standard of living. Although, of
course, it may have conscious and advertised components. For example, open
space on which to build a home was at one time considered a natural resource of
the United States that that community accepted as part of its heritage and re-
sponsibility to its members. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYrmNG IN ITS PLACE:
SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 32-77 (1977). See also Lance Morrow,
Downsizing the American Dream, TasE, Oct. 5, 1981, at 95; Leonard S. Rubi-
nowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Im-
plementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 491 (1979).
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based on the amount and type of environmental management
implicated by the MQE.
The relationship between community identity and envi-
ronmental management is a subtle but important one, re-
flecting the interface of community goals and governing
philosophy. The manner in which a community defines its
obligations toward individuals (both community members
and those nonmembers that are affected by the community's
policies) is an important aspect of the community's identity.
Individuals, alone or in groups, that feel they are not receiv-
ing appropriate treatment from a community-in this case,
not benefitting from environmental management in a way
consonant with the community's identity-are apt to contrib-
ute to community instability.28
Such an understanding of environmental management
suggests that it is impossible and misleading to separate en-
vironmental management from concepts ofjustice. While jus-
tice in the environmental context will be discussed in greater
depth below, a few words of introduction must be said here.
The discussion in this article will focus on justice as it relates
to community members' ability to attain a minimum quality
of environment. It is not my aim to judge the appropriate-
ness of the specific governing philosophy of a community; I
hope only to show how inconsistencies between expectations
and practice may lead to community instability, thus posing a
threat to environmental security.
Furthermore, defining natural resources in a way that
allows origination outside of the political boundaries of a com-
munity raises difficult questions of intercommunity obliga-
tion and, ultimately, intercommunity justice. Should a
modern understanding of environmental management in-
clude an obligation to help manage the natural resources
originating within the political jurisdiction of another com-
munity? I will argue that an environmentally-based concept
of justice necessitates that communities, in some situations,
should help other communities to manage not only jointly de-
28. See discussion infra section il.B.1.
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sired natural resources, but even ones for which the first com-
munity has no direct need.
The connection between environmental management and
justice is but one of the complexities that undergird any de-
scription of environmental security. Current policy initia-
tives at all levels of governance recognize that many
environmental management problems 29 will necessitate re-
sponses that integrate concerns about justice into more tradi-
tional regulatory schemes.3 0
This article attempts to determine whether there can be
a description of environmental security that will recognize
both the unique qualities of different communities as well as
the inherent connections between them. I will describe a sin-
gle theory because it is my belief that with respect to certain
environmental management dilemmas, the world should be
treated as a single community; discrete responses to such di-
lemmas will fail to include the complex political and social
responses that are necessary to ensure effective environmen-
tal management. Furthermore, a unified theory of environ-
mental security will help to facilitate environmental
management that recognizes and promotes environmental
justice.
II. Characterizing Environmental Security
The ability to ensure access to an uninterrupted supply
of petroleum for its citizens and businesses is an important
part of the United States' identity. When the Iraqi forces in-
vaded Kuwait and threatened to take over the vast Saudi
Arabian oil exporting capacity, the United States reacted de-
cisively to stop the assault. The motivation for the United
States' response in the Persian Gulf was the threat repre-
sented by an unacceptable attempt to gain control over natu-
29. The term "environmental management problem" is used in this article
instead of the more commonly employed "environmental problem" because the
latter dissociates humans from their causative role.
30. See, e.g., Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629 (1994); The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
1995] 545
13
546 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
ral resources. While this threat may be understood either as
a direct threat to the U.S. standard of living or as a threat to
international norms for maintaining access to natural re-
sources, or both, the ramification of the threat was that the
governing body of the United States ultimately felt it neces-
sary to go to war to respond to the challenge.
A. The Dynamic of Community Natural Resource Use
While the term will be more formally defined below, envi-
ronmental security, as used in this article, refers to a commu-
nity's state of assurance that its stability as a community will
not be threatened by a lack of proper management of the nat-
ural resources it deems to be necessary parts of its identity-
the community's specific cultural, historical, and philosophi-
cal context within which the community defines itself. Such a
concept rests on the assumption that each governing body is
accountable to the community as a whole for the sort of envi-
ronment dictated by the community's identity. A threat to
environmental security comes from the inability of a gov-
erning body to ensure this desired quality of environment.
1. Natural Resources and Governing Bodies
The maintenance of environmental security is associated
with the governing body's ability to be perceived by the com-
munity as ensuring the quality of environment implicated by
its community-specific identity. Thus, the governing body is
pressed between a need to assure the community of its ability
to make natural resources available and the possibility that it
will not be able to provide such resources. The necessary bal-
ance of these pressures may be disturbed from both sides.
Forces uncontrollable or uncontrolled by the governing body
might disrupt community environmental management, and
the community may begin to doubt the governing body's abil-
ity to ensure the necessary quality of environment.
a. Control of Natural Resource Management
Ensuring the community-appropriate quality of environ-
ment might be a difficult task. For many reasons the gov-
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erning body might be unable or unwilling to control natural
resources in a way that the community perceives as conso-
nant with its identity. Specifically, the governing body must
be wary of potential intercommunity and intracommunity ob-
stacles to its own control.
When a community imports natural resources from for-
eign communities, 31 the governing body's ability to control
the resource is limited. The logistical problems of getting the
natural resources to the community's borders32 are fre-
quently out of the governing body's control. The source com-
munity may not have the infrastructure, political stability, or
institutions3 3 necessary to reliably export the natural re-
sources. Also, intercommunity forces external to the recipi-
ent community may interrupt intercommunity natural
resource flow. For example, a war between two communities
might effectively make both of them unable to complete natu-
ral resource exportation to a third party community,34 or the
31. The term "foreign community" is used here to describe a community
that is other than the one in question. It is not meant as a description of the
community's geographic relationship or of the nature of the foreign commu-
nity's identity.
32. Intracommunity transportation of natural resources may also pose lo-
gistical problems for the governing body. See, e.g., infra notes 35-39 and accom-
panying text.
33. A natural resource in one community will not be available to other com-
munities if the originating community lacks the institutional ability to export
it. For example, community-specific norms that function to regulate intracom-
munity behavior may be less rigidly followed in the international context. See
Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1293
(1985); Louis Henkin, The Politics of Law Observance, in How NATIONS BEHAVE
(2d ed., 1979). This may lead to the situation where a natural resource
originating in one community is not traded because it does not meet the quality,
processing, or handling standards of the potential importer. See, e.g., Carl
Pope, Don't Trade Environment, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 1993, at 10A. See also
Dan Izenberg, Knesset Rejects NRP Move to Ban Import of Nonkosher Meat,
JERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 13, 1994, at 4.
34. Even if such exportation is not physically impossible, there might be
political reasons why such natural resource flow would be disrupted. For exam-
ple, in an effort to force the military government of Haiti to allow the restora-
tion to power of the democratically-elected government of President Aristide, on
May 21, 1994, a year-old United Nations embargo against Haiti was stepped up
to cover the trade of all commodities except food and medicine. Steven Green-
house, U.S. Shifts Stress to Haiti Sanctions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1994, at A3;
Howard W. French, Haiti Military Braces for Total Embargo, hINL HERALD
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trade of a natural resource may be interrupted by a natural
disaster.35
A community may not be able to engage effectively in in-
tercommunity natural resource trade because of large eco-
nomic disparities in wealth between the communities. 36 The
difference in economic strength might be so great that the
community desiring the natural resource cannot afford the
price of the substance originating in a relatively inflated
economy.37 Even though less affluent communities may ar-
gue that they have a moral claim to natural resources despite
an inability to pay for them, 38 this argument does not always
Tam., May 24, 1994; Clinton Issues Executive Order Implementing U.N. Haiti
Embargo, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A88 (May 10, 1994).
35. For example, the 1993 flooding of the Mississippi River made obtaining
food and other supplies extremely difficult for local residents. See, e.g., Edward
Walsh, Where Two Great Rivers Come Together, Flooded Town Hangs On,
WASH. POST, July 30, 1993, at A3; Jeremy Campbell, Floods Create a Sixth
Great Lake; Rains Kill 410 in India, EVENING STAND., July 19, 1993, at 6.
36. See generally discussion infra section IV.B.2 and part V regarding the
obligation of industrialized communities to aid less-industrialized communities
with respect to environmental management.
37. Within the context of natural resource management, large disparities of
wealth between countries is often associated with the concept of neocolonialism.
Theorists of neocolonialism suggest that even after many less-industrialized
countries have gained their independence, the industrialized countries continue
to control their economies through economic means. ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE
INEQUALITY OF NATIONS 68 (1977). The motivation for this control supposedly
includes the desire of the industrialized nations to maintain access to inexpen-
sive, poorly protected natural resources, without which the industrialized econ-
omies would stagnate. The method of this neocolonial control is subtle, varied,
and institutionalized. It usually is seen in the lending practices of private
banks, governments, and international lending organizations such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. See generally ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF
NATIONS (1977); WARNER MAX CORDEN, THE NIEO PROPOSALS: A COOL LOOK
(1979); PAUL M. WATSON, OvERsEAs DEVELOPMENT CouNcIL, DEBT AND THE DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW PROBLEMS AND NEW AcTORs (1978). The results of
neocolonialism are that the environments of less-industrialized countries are
degraded by foreign entities that have no cultural tie to the affected environ-
ment and who are often immune from host-country environmental regulations.
For a description of some of the results of such practices, see generally WORLD
CON3ISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPmENT, UNITED NATIONS, OUR COM-
MON FUTURE (1987). See also infra note 199.
38. The claim that less-developed countries either deserve or are owed aid
in acquiring or developing natural resources is often related to the various neg-
ative attributes associated with disparities in wealth between countries. See
supra note 33. See also discussion infra section II1A. Beyond the documents
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translate into real policy changes.3 9 Such disparities leave
poorer communities particularly vulnerable to environmental
degradation and ultimately to instability.40
Whether natural resources originate within a community
or not, the governing body must get the natural resources to
the expectant community members. 4' This task may be diffi-
cult to accomplish. To affect intracommunity environmental
management, the community must develop transport lines or
local refining capability. Such projects at least necessitate
communication skills and technology, access to capital,42 and
and arguments that were first propounded in relation to the New International
Economic Order, see sources at id., these arguments are also visited in scholarly
journals. See, e.g., Bernard P. Herber, The Common Heritage Principal: Ant-
arctica and the Developing Nations, 50 Am. J. ECON. AND SOCIOLOGY 391 (1991);
Daniel B. Magraw, Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Con-
textual, and Absolute Norms, 1 COLO. J. Tr'iL ENvLr. L. AND PoLIcY 69 (1990);
A. Kuflik, Allocation and Ownership of World Resources: A Symposium Over-
view, 23 J. VAuE INQUIRY 249 (1989); B-A. Singer, An Extension of Rawls' The-
ory of Justice to Environmental Ethics, 10 ENvrL. ETmcs 217 (1988).
39. For example, despite the attention focused on and enthusiasm to con-
front the concerns of less-industrialized countries with respect to the nexus be-
tween economic development and environmental protection displayed at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Brazil in
June of 1992, currently there is concern that the conference's progressive
"Agenda 21" has been largely unrealized. See More Action Said Needed to
Blend Environmental Protection, Development, Int'l Envt Daily (BNA) (June 2,
1994). However, some modern international environmental law instruments do
begin to address the injustices that are associated with historically-based dis-
parities of wealth between nations and these disparities' effect on environmen-
tal management. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 LL.M. 1541, contains provisions for
"Research, Development, Public Awareness and Exchange of Information," and
"Technical Assistance." Id. at 1556-57. The Protocol also outlines special treat-
ment for less-industrialized countries, including extended compliance dead-
lines, as well as support for technology transfer and funding mechanisms. Id.
at 1555.
40. See generally Philip Shenon, Now It's the Jungle That the Khmer Rouge
Decimates, N.Y. TnIEs, Feb. 7, 1993, at 4; Thomas Homer-Dixon, supra note 3;
Sylvia Nasar, It's Never Fair to Just Blame the Weather, N.Y. TaMms, Jan. 17,
1993, at El. See also discussion infra section H.B.
41. That is, if it is to succeed in its obligations as a governing body. See
discussion infra section ll.B.1.
42. The start up costs of environmental management facilities are fre-
quently quite high. For example, the expense of facility start up compounds
already difficult management decisions regarding municipal solid waste dispo-
sal. See Bernard A. Weintraub & John Rousalds, Packaging, Environmentally
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the capability to engage in coordinated planning.43 Further-
more, the natural resource in question might be expensive;
relative to the importance of the natural resource and the
constituency desiring it, the governing body might feel unable
to subsidize or ration the commodity. 4 While the governing
body in power may not be responsible for the lack of commu-
nity economic and technical strength,45 the members of the
community might well hold it accountable anyway.
There might be reasons why a governing body, regard-
less of cost, would be unwilling or unable to make natural
resources available to members of its community. Natural
resource management decisions reflect political will. A gov-
erning body might be less responsive to the desires of some
members of a community than others.46 Such selectivity may
be reasonable within the context of a certain community's
identity.47 If it is not, environmental security may be
threatened. 48
b. Natural Resource Governance
As the preceding discussion suggests, the environmental
security of a community is correlated to the governing body's
control over environmental management. Pressure on the
governing body to ensure a certain quality of environment
Protective Municipal Solid Waste Management, and the Limits to the Economic
Premise, 21 ECOLoGY L.Q. (forthcoming 1994).
43. Many of the same logistical problems that exist in the intercommunity
context are also obstacles to intracommunity natural resource flow. See supra
notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
44. The extent to which the governing body is willing to subsidize or ration
the use of natural resources is a reflection of that body's balancing of its role as
ensurer of access to natural resources with its need to ensure that access at a
cost that is reasonable to the community as a whole. For example, there is
currently a debate within the United States regarding whether subsidizing
grazing rights for ranchers is beneficial or detrimental to the overall well-being
of the United States. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
45. These deficiencies might have been caused by mismanagement by previ-
ous governing bodies or by unanticipated events that the current governing
body cannot control. See, e.g., supra notes 28-29.
46. This discrimination might be overt, or it might be institutionalized
within the governance of the community. See discussion infra section lIHA.
47. For examples, see infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
48. See discussion infra section ILA.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
and the responses to those pressures may be grouped into in-
tracommunity-motivated and intercommunity-motivated
threats to environmental security; these threats will be ex-
plored in more depth in parts III and IV below. It will suffice
here to suggest that there are two ways that a governing body
might attempt to minimize the potential for community in-
stability precipitated by its lack of control.
The first is that the governing body may seek to cast it-
self in a favorable light with respect to ensuring the commu-
nity-specific quality of environment. While it is beyond the
scope of this discussion to analyze the methods with which a
governing body might accomplish this, some techniques in-
clude attempting to convince community members that their
expectations with respect to environmental management are
inappropriate, 49 arguing that environmental needs are being
met but that the community members do not realize it, 5o and
suggesting that the governing body had provided the appro-
priate quality of environment, but that some other uncontrol-
lable force is responsible for undermining those efforts.5 1
Because the threats to many of a community's natural
resources come from foreign communities and third party
pressures, the second way in which a governing body will
seek to maintain a given quality of environment is to
strengthen intercommunity relations. For example, the gov-
erning body of New York might want to ensure the flow of
certain natural resources that are produced on the west coast
of the United States. To do this it engages in interstate com-
merce, thus participating as an actor in the broader commu-
nity of the United States. Similarly, the governing body of
49. Or, in the terminology adopted below, that the "minimum quality of en-
vironment" is inappropriate. See discussion infra section fl.B.
50. For example, the government might represent that, if allowed, it would
ensure access to a reasonable amount of the desired natural resource. How-
ever, community members demanding the natural resource are demanding
more than that for which those members are proportionately willing to pay, and
thus the governing body is acting in the best interests of the whole community
by not subsidizing the natural resource.
51. For example, the governing body might represent that it would ensure
access to the desired natural resource, if not for a natural disaster that has
made that task impossible.
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Thailand might attempt to maintain access to natural re-
sources originating in Indonesia; to solidify this trade Thai-
land might contract directly via either traditional bilateral
negotiations, or might participate in a regional multilateral
regime such as that delimited by the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations,52 both of which would be tantamount to par-
ticipating in a second, broader governance structure that fa-
cilitates the trade amongst component communities.
In a sense, then, it is often in each community's, and thus
each governing body's, best interest for there to exist some
type of transcommunity, natural resource trade federation in
which a larger governing structure has an interest in main-
taining intercommunity natural resource flows. 53 Beyond the
obvious benefit of allowing governing bodies to strengthen
their assurances of a given quality of environment to their
community members, federations have other positive aspects.
Because the trade regime would be a community itself, the
governing body of the trade regime would seek to maintain
its own legitimacy by supporting the relationships between
its component communities. Furthermore, as James Madison
emphasized in The Federalist No. 10, a properly structured
federation may allow proper representation in governance
without trampling on the rights of those who are not of the
majority.54 Therefore, a well-constructed, representative nat-
ural resource trade federation would be able to respect the
52. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was initiated by
the Bangkok Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 T.L.M. 1233. The association is com-
prised of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
53. Of course, such federations already exist. For example, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Act
(NAFTA), and even the European Union all were conceived and initiated as
attempts to facilitate freedom of trade between various parties.
54. JAMS MADISON, Federalist No. 10 (1788), reprinted in ALEXANDER HAM-
iLTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST 53-62 (Modern Library 1937). As Madison wrote,
"the majority.., must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable
to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression." Id. at 58. Madison be-
lieved that the ills of democracies were based on "factionalism-the tendency
for people to form groups that are intolerant of those not within the group. Id.
at 54. If such a group were to gain dominance, it could systematically oppress
those in the minority.
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needs of all of the represented communities, 55 as well as pro-
vide collective governance.
2. Formulating a Minimum Quality of Environment
The environment that a community demands reflects the
community's perceptions of its right to a certain standard of
living. Because this expectation is in part historically de-
rived,56 the expected environment might not be the one that a
given governing body would like to acknowledge. For exam-
ple, the community might support a quality of environment
more costly to achieve than that which the governing body
feels the community can afford or that which the governing
body wishes to promote. 57 In this case the governing body
may find itself in a position where it must choose whether or
not to make natural resources available in order to maintain
its legitimacy, regardless of the political, social or economic
cost of such an enterprise. This political decision, of course, is
complicated by the shifting parameters of the environment
which must be managed. Recognizing the complex relation-
ship between the community's natural resource require-
ments, and the ability and will of the governing body to make
those natural resources available, a minimum quality of envi-
ronment (MQE) may be defined as the amount and type of
benefits of environmental management that must be main-
tained for a given community to maintain its identity.
55. Madison did not foresee that factions might form across state bounda-
ries. Nonterritorial bases of intolerance were not addressed until the Recon-
struction Amendments to the United States Constitution, which sought to
strengthen further the federal government in an effort to ensure that people
were not oppressed because they were not members of the policy-setting
majority.
56. That is, based on the historical performance of the community's gov-
erning body and economy.
57. There are many reasons why this might come about. It might be that
the community previously enjoyed a quality of environment that it cannot pres-
ently sustain because of economic hardships. In this case, the governing body
might fear inflated expectations. Or, the community's priorities-and thus de-
manded quality of environment-might shift with information regarding other
communities or with respect to newly perceived needs of the community (e.g.,
upon publication of a study that inversely relates a child's access to wilderness
with later adult criminal activity, the community may make accessible wilder-
ness a higher priority).
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Environmental security is the stability a community ex-
periences when the governing body succeeds in providing at
least the amount and type of environmental management im-
plicated by the MQE. Environmental security concerns arise
when a governing body fails to manage the community's envi-
ronment in a way consonant with the community's identity as
reflected in the community's MQE. Discriminatory policies of
the governing body, poor development of intracommunity al-
location methods, ineffective or subversive intercommunity
relations, changing expectations of the community, and exter-
nal factors may all be threats to environmental security.
B. Community Instability and Environmental Security
1. Destabilizing Factors: Why Lack of Natural
Resources Causes Insecurity
The assertion that community instability results from a
governing body's inability to ensure a certain quality of envi-
ronment appears to follow an assumption that the content-
ment of community members is correlated to the security of
the community as a whole. However, even if this assertion is
true, it could be argued that because some members of a com-
munity might have greater access to political control than
others, only those "powerful" members of society need to ben-
efit from the MQE. Thus, the argument might continue, for a
governing body to maintain control for a minimal cost, it need
only ensure the MQE of the "powerful" community members.
However, while it might be true that certain people or
groups within a community have a greater ability to
destabilize a community than do others, it is not clear that
these "weaker" populations are unable to affect community
stability. Indeed, it could be argued that community security
is rarely upset by those with the greatest access to power.
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the governing body may not
be based solely on the consent of the powerful. 58 And, regard-
58. At least that is the premise of most modern governments. See generally
THoMAs FRNc, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); MAX
WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIO ORGANIZATION (A. M. Henderson
& Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
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less of the precise share of power that each community mem-
ber enjoys, it may be argued that a vision of environmental
security that includes norms of justice demands that the com-
munity strive to define an MQE that reflects the needs of all
community members. 59
a. Threats to Environmental Security
Threats to environmental security occur when a gov-
erning body fails to ensure access to natural resources at the
level represented by the community's MQE. Such threats
might occur in many different ways. As suggested above,60
physical access to natural resources might be threatened di-
rectly by intracommunity and intercommunity conditions. In
this type of situation, community members may be shown
that the governing body does not have effective control of en-
vironmental management.
Other uncontrollable or uncontrolled occurrences might
also serve to weaken the community's belief that the gov-
erning body has the ability to ensure its MQE. Foreign or
domestic groups might influence or challenge the commu-
nity's perception of its needs.6 ' If this influence succeeds, the
MQE might well change. Such a shift in the standard against
which the governing body will be judged might catch the gov-
erning body by surprise, making it look unresponsive or inca-
pable of ensuring the newly required level of environmental
management. Similarly, foreign or domestic groups might di-
rectly challenge the ability of a governing body to effectively
manage its environment. To the extent that community
members believe that their governing body is so unable, the
environmental security of the community is threatened.
59. See discussion infra section IIIA2.
60. See discussion supra section H.A.I.a.
61. One example of the result of this dynamic is the social disruption that
German unification has unleashed. While some of the cause of the agitation is
purely the result of startled economic markets, much is the result of the altered
expectations of both East and West German citizens with respect to what they
believe they are owed by the new German government. See Tyler Marshall,
New Wall Divides Germany; This One Is Emotional and Social, Not Physical,
L.A. TinMs, June 16, 1991, at Al.
1995] 555
23
556 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
b. The Dynamic of Collective Action
Threats to environmental security are, of course, one way
of describing a governing body's concern about discontent.
Every governing body understands that the inability to ob-
tain the natural resources that are necessary to pursue a ca-
reer, to maintain a healthful life, or to provide a minimum
level of healthful existence to one's family, challenges each
community member's respect for the governing body. While
the individual's needs might be met in other ways by the rele-
vant governing body (e.g., through direct or indirect financial
assistance), such social benefits are a poor substitute for indi-
viduals being able to obtain environmental benefits directly
at some community-defined minimum level. Thus, MQE rep-
resents a standard below which an individual might well feel
that she or he is living a life deemed of less than minimum
significance by the community as a whole.
The consequences of governance failure to provide for
community members' needs-natural resource needs or
otherwise-has been a subject of scholarly discourse at least
since the time of Machiavelli. In the nineteenth century Karl
Marx described the dynamic of social change as being corre-
lated to individuals' alienation from the societies in which
they existed.6 2 According to this theory, alienation occurs
when people do not have the ability to control their own lives
and futures within the context of their communities.63 While
it might seem a stretch to suggest that alienation in modern
society is a result of the lack of a certain quality of environ-
62. KARL MARx, TH EcoNoMc AND PHILOSOPWICAL MANUSCRnrS (1844),
reprinted in KARL MARX EARLY WRrINGS, at 127 (T.B. Bottomore ed., 1963).
This alienation was a result of the process of industrialization that: "(1) alien-
ates nature from man; and (2) alienates man from himself, from his own active
function, his life activity; so it alienates him from the [human] species." Id.
63. While Marx might be one of the first philosophers to discuss alienation
within the context of industrialization, the formal understanding, and effect, of
alienation has much older roots. For example, Istvan Meszaros identifies four
bases of modern alienation: the Judaic concept of a fall from grace; the objectifi-
cation of all value (what Meszaros calls "universal salability"); contradictions in
humanity's role in history; and contradictions within the contractarian model of
humans' historical relationship with nature. IsTvAN MESZAROS, MARX'S THEORY
OF ALiENATioN 35 (1970).
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ment, this point has been made. For example, in his book,
The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture, Wendell
Berry discusses alienation from nature and its effect on indi-
viduals. He describes a social system in which specialization
becomes necessary and a broad appreciation of the Earth be-
comes remote. While efficient, Berry suggests about this sort
of society that:
though [it] becomes more and more intricate, it has less
and less structure.... No longer does human life rise from
the earth like a pyramid, broadly and considerately
founded upon its sources. Now it scatters itself out in a
reckless horizontal sprawl, like a disorderly city whose
suburbs and pavements destroy the fields.64
To Berry, the individual suffers a crisis of character in mod-
ern society. Because success is defined in terms of social
achievement in a specialist world, the individual feels obliged
to increase her or his capital wealth. When this self-defining
need is hampered by an actual structure of the community
that disallows accumulation (i.e., by supporting hierarchies of
access to education, political power, and natural resource),
the individual is lost in Rousseau's "rivalry and competition
and becomes bitter.65 As Berry writes, "[t]hat [the individ-
ual] is dependent upon so many specialists, the beneficiary of
so much expert help, can only mean that he is a captive, a
potential victim." 66
As both Marx and Berry suggest, individual members of
a community strive, in the end, to have some control over
their lives. And as this discussion implies, access to a certain
quality of environment is a reflection of access to political
power. When this access is denied, community members in-
ternalize a separateness from society that festers along with
64. BERRY, supra note 10, at 21.
65. Even earlier than Marx, Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed that access to
accumulation of wealth often served to form a world of "rivalry and competition
on one hand, and conflicting interests on the other, together with a secret desire
on both of profiting at the expense of others." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SocuL CoNTRAc AND DiscouRsEs 87 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1973).
66. BERRY, supra note 10, at 21.
1995]
25
558 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
their perceived injustice of unfair treatment. From this ano-
mie of alienation comes the dynamic of social change.
Charles Tilly has identified four primary components of col-
lective action: the existence of collective interests; organiza-
tion; the catalyst known as mobilization; and the opportunity
to act.67 As Tilly makes clear, collective identity is an impor-
tant part of most of these components of action, and thus of
social change. 68
With respect to environmental security, a community's
MQE represents that level of environmental management be-
low which individuals, within the context of their collective
identity as a community, are likely to feel that they are not
being treated justly. In such a situation, there is an in-
creased risk of transvaluation 69 and, ultimately, social un-
rest. When this occurs the community in general, and the
governing body in particular, may be confronted with a move-
ment to redefine the nature of the community.70
c. Responses to Environmental Mismanagement
The part of a community that feels its environmental
needs unfulfilled under the reigning governing body might
seek to redefine the parameters of that community primarily
in two ways. First, those discouraged by the current commu-
nity might dissociate, in effect forming a new community.
67. See generally CHARLES WILLY, FRomI MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION(1978). See also FRANCES Fox PivEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MovEmENTs : WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977).
68. See TILLY, supra note 61, at 52-142. One of the reasons for this is that
in the early phases of unrest, transvaluation must occur. Transvaluation be-
gins when individuals feel that their personal suffering is not isolated, but is
part of a community-wide injustice. As the individual comes to believe that her
or his actions to redress a problem will have a benefit beyond her or his individ-
ual life, and when that benefit becomes additional motivation to react to the
injustice, transvaluation is complete. "For a protest movement to arise out of
the traumas of daily life, people have to perceive the deprivation and disorgani-
zation they experience as both wrong, and subject to redress." PVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 61, at 12.
69. See supra note 62.
70. The lack of access to natural resources such as food and adequate space
for housing, often catalyzed by economic recession, has been the catalyst for
social movements in the past. See, e.g., PrVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 61, at 47-
48, 267-72.
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The effectiveness of such a move would be determined by the
governing philosophy of the existing community. While there
is a range within which secessionary movements successfully
separate from the parent government, domestic and interna-
tional laws generally do not support such behavior.71 How-
ever, there are less dramatic examples of community
reformation. Within an existing community, a new commu-
nity might arise to augment or take the place of the original
community with respect to the specific needs of a particular
group of people. For example, cultural or religious groups
might exist, such as the Amish or Hasidim, that prefer to gov-
ern their own lives to the greatest extent possible. These
communities within larger political communities might gov-
ern certain aspects of environmental management, such as
ensuring that its community members have access to land or
food.
The other way that a social movement operates to recon-
figure the operative parameters of the relevant community is
to redefine the role of the community itself. With appropriate
pressure and education, the community may redefine its
MQE and thus its identity. For example, when a disaster
strikes a community (e.g., a flood leaves some community
members homeless), the community might quickly shift its
MQE in order to reflect new priorities necessary to respond to
the community crisis. Similarly, political realities might
force the governing body of a community to support increased
natural resource price supports for a commodity that was
previously out of many community members' price range.
Also, a governing body might attempt to convince the commu-
nity that the current quality of environment is unsustainable
or in some other way inappropriate.
71. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self Determination: A Territo-
rial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. IN'L L. 177 (1991); Barbara W. Carlson, Can
Urban Woes Be Overcome By Secession?, N.Y. TxmEs, Oct. 3, 1993, § 13 (Con-
necticut Weekly), at 1.
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2. Defining Environmental Security as Part of
Defining Identity
Beyond the promotion of a community-determined, ade-
quate standard of living that ensuring the MQE represents,
the community has another reason to maintain environmen-
tal security. Community security is enhanced when commu-
nity members understand and aid in the development of
environmental management policy. From the broadest point
of view, maintaining environmental security is about main-
taining a collective understanding of the needs and aspira-
tions of the community. Environmental security is thus
intricately related to the communication, values, and educa-
tion that comprise inculcation of identity.
a. Education and Identity
A community cannot exist without promoting and sus-
taining its institutions. Education, both formal and informal,
acts as the necessary intergenerational transfer of identity.
Education is essential for community stability not only
because it helps to nurture widespread understanding of the
community's identity, but because the dialectic of education
itself helps to shape that identity. The process of increasing
awareness has the useful effect of instilling curiosity and,
eventually, criticism. 72 In much the same way that the scien-
tific method utilizes curiosity and criticism as a tool in the
quest to better describe phenomena, the dialectic of education
works to refine social identity.73 Instead of seeking to de-
scribe phenomena, however, the criticism that arises from ed-
ucation works to thrust the community's aspirations into
debate, and therefore, to expose and respond to community-
defined injustices.74
This process of identity refinement has been identified
with respect to the evolution of environmental ethics. In A
72. See generally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
73. To the extent that education is limited in its freedom of inquiry, it fails
to be liberating. FREiRE at 27-56.
74. Id. at 27-56. The increasing refinement of a community's identity to
include evolving ethical considerations is a process which helps to define that
community.
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Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold recognized that evolu-
tion of an ethic was part of a society realizing its own needs
as a community.75 He wrote that:
[an ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meet-
ing ecological situations so new or intricate, or involving
such deferred reactions, that the path of social expediency
is not discernible to the average individual. Animal in-
stincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting
such situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community
instinct in-the-making.76
The specific ethic identified by Leopold is one that redefines
the relationship of humans to the Earth.77
b. The Relevance of Increased Awareness About
Environmental Management Issues
If education is the process for ensuring an identity that
corresponds to the evolving needs of the community, then ed-
ucation about environmental management is a necessary
part of insuring environmental security. To these ends, the
environmental education movement has attempted to synthe-
size a pedagogy of policy, science, and social studies.78 The
75. Leopold emphasized that the development of society mirrored that of
ecological evolution. He wrote: "[the] extension of ethics... is actually a pro-
cess in ecological evolution.... An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom
of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentia-
tion of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing."
ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC 202 (1987).
76. Id. at 203.
77. Leopold suggests that an environmental ethic redefines not only the in-
dividual's relationship with the Earth, but also with the broader community.
He writes:
[tihe land ethic... enlarges the boundaries of the community to
include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land
.... In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.
It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the
community as suck
LEOPOLD at 239-40.
78. Probably the most famous definition of environmental education was
formulated by W.B. Stapp in 1969. He wrote: "Environmental Education is
aimed at producing a citizenry that is knowledgeable concerning the biophysi-
cal environment and its associated problems, aware of how to help solve these
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foresight of this goal should not be dismissed. By actively in-
culcating environmental ethics, environmental awareness
nurtures a public consciousness that will lead to future alter-
ations in public policy.
Beyond the Earth-protecting goals of environmental edu-
cation, such education is devoted to a new ethic of problem-
solving. This is sensible because, as Leopold suggested, the
establishment of ethics is "actually a process in ecological
evolution." As long as humans conceptualize themselves and
their relationships as part of the Earth's environment, then
their collective social decisions-including the establishment
and evolution of a community identity-are environmental
ones.
Environmental awareness directly promotes environ-
mental security in other ways as well. Many environmental
management problems are very difficult to understand and to
solve. Such problems differ from other types of policy chal-
lenges in several ways: they often have irreversible conse-
quences;79 their scale (in both time80 and space8 1) may be
much larger than other problems; they are difficult to value
problems, and motivated to work toward their solution." W.B. Stapp et al. The
Concept of Environmental Education, 1 J. ENvTL. EDUC. 31 (1969). More re-
cently, a scholar expanded Stapp's definition by characterizing a citizenry that
is:
1) knowledgeable about the biophysical and sociocultural environ-
ment of which man is a part; 2) aware of environmental problems
as well as of management alternatives of use in solving these
problems; 3) motivated to act responsibly in developing diverse en-
vironments that are optimal for living a quality life; and 4) willing
to be involved in social activities for improving the environment in
which he lives.
Uri Zoller, The Israeli Environmental Education Project: A New Model of Inter-
disciplinary Student-Oriented Curriculum, 18 J. ENvTL. EDUC. 25, 25-26
(1986)(citations omitted).
79. For example, the nascent field of conservation biology stresses that ge-
netic information, stored in biotic matter, is lost forever when humans engage
in practices that cause extinction. See generally CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE
SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND DirsRsrrY (Michael E. Soule ed., 1986).
80. The notion of intergenerational equity suggests that there are no one-
time solutions to environmental management problems; the "solutions" will be
a constant state of ecological vigilance. For a well-reasoned treatment of the
compulsion for this obligation, see EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNEsS To FuTuRE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, CoMMoN PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERA-
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in traditional ways;8 2 they are unique and therefore their so-
lutions may not be easily transferable from one set of circum-
stances to another;8 3 they necessitate extensive simultaneous
reliance on specialists from diverse fields (e.g., ecologists,
sociologists, economists);84 and they are premised on and dic-
tate responses based on uncertainty.8 5 The burden of re-
§ponding to environmental management problems is so great
that the community's priorities for environmental manage-
ment may well be different from the governing body's. Envi-
ronmental security is sure to be threatened in such a world.
Environmental awareness promotes the establishment of a
commonly understood body of knowledge and, therefore, the
discourse that may lead to environmental security.
TIONAL EQUITY (1989) and Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conserva-
tion and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 540 (1984).
81. The physical scope of international environmental problems may range
from single border (e.g., acid rain) to regional (e.g., protection of a regionally
shared watershed) to global concerns (e.g., climate change).
82. For example, privatization, the traditional solution to poor manage-
ment, may not be readily applicable to all natural resource management. Econ-
omists have long debated the ability of free-market mechanisms to protect the
environment. A recent move to incorporate environmental "costs" (traditionally
ignored as externalities) into the gross national product of states has gained
some favor. See Marlise Simons, Europeans Begin to Calculate the Price of Pol-
lution, N.Y. Toms, Dec. 9, 1990, at E3; Peter Passell, Rebel Economists Add
Ecological Cost to Price of Progress, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 27, 1990, at C1.
83. Because international environmental management problems often re-
flect unique ecological, cultural, political, historical, and logistical factors, solu-
tions must be unique to the circumstances. See LYNTON IM CALDWELL,
INTERNATIONAL ENvIRoNMNTAL PoLICY: EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS 9-11
(1984). See also discussion infra section V.C.
84. Promotion of enhanced status for nongovernmental organizations has
long been a goal of international environmental activists in part because of the
necessity of involving experts from a wide range of fields. See generally, Phi-
lippe Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 393 (1989). For further discussion of the increasing role of nongov-
ernmental organizations see, e.g., WERNER J. FELD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS: A CoMPARATIvE APPROACH 3 (1983); PREssuRE GRoUPs IN THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM (Peter Willetts ed., 1982). However, states may view reliance
on nonnational representatives as threatening to the autonomous decision
making of states. See, e.g., CHIANG PEI-HENG, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE, AND FUNCTION 188 (1981).
85. See generally Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environ-
mental Law, and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining
Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (1992).
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Environmental security and environmental education
are linked by a common goal to infuse each community's iden-
tity with the desire to discern a community-appropriate qual-
ity of environment. To the extent that environmental
awareness promotes the evolution of an identity that identi-
fies and supports environmentally protective natural re-
source management, environmental security will be easier to
define and maintain.
Because each community's MQE represents the parame-
ters within which each community perceives its responsibili-
ties to maintain its environment, the object of the remainder
of this article will be to characterize how MQEs are affected
by the intracommunity and intercommunity forces that help
to shape each community's MQE. This exercise will allow an
understanding of the relationship between humans and the
Earth to further emerge. Specifically, by examining the con-
cept of MQE, environmental security may be shown to be a
global ideal, only fully achievable as part of a universaliza-
tion of environmental responsibility and justice.
III. Intracommunity Aspects of Environmental
Security
Many threats to environmental security originate in the
relationship between a governing body and the community it
governs. 86 While the threshold to an environmental security
threat is as unique as the community's identity, a common
basis of community dissatisfaction is perceived inequities in
the management of natural resources. Intracommunity-moti-
vated environmental security concerns often reflect the gov-
erning body's discriminatory use of power.
86. Even when the natural resource that precipitates community instability
originates in a foreign community, the actual threat to environmental security
is often, at least in part, propelled by the community's dissatisfaction with the
governing body's management of the situation. See discussion infra section
IV.K
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A. The Governors and the Governed
The dynamic of environmental security sketched in the
last part of this article presumes that every governing body is
a governing body because, at least to some extent, it manages
the community's relationship to its natural resources, i.e., its
environment. Beyond its usefulness in helping to define the
governing body itself, this control is necessary because it as-
sures that the governing body will be able to respond to shifts
in the community's needs. Furthermore, this control allows
the governing body to shape environmental management in a
way that it most desires; for example, the governing body
may be able to increase its legitimacy by ensuring that the
needs of more numerous or influential portions of the commu-
nity are met. Even if meeting the demands of the influential
leaves less for other members of the community, the political
benefit for the governing body may be deemed worth any dis-
sonance that the action might cause.
That the governing body controls the community's envi-
ronmental management does not necessarily mean that the
governing body directly provides access to a given natural re-
source itself. The governing body may achieve its ends by
merely supporting a given flow of natural resources within
the community. For example, the United States government
supports certain natural resource uses by promoting lending,
tax laws, and agricultural policies that favor large farm busi-
nesses and practices over smaller-scaled, often family-owned,
farms.87 Many examples of more direct control come from
land use policy. The United States government promotes the
ranching industry by allowing cattle to be grazed on federal
land at rates below that which the private market would dic-
tate.88 By doing so, the government supports access to graz-
87. See generally MARK KRAmR, THiEE FARMs: MAKING MILK, MEAT AND
MoNE FROM THE AMEmcAN Sore (1980); BERRY, supra note 10, at 27-38, 51-79.
See also Peter T. Kilborn, Iowa Farmers Rebel Against Subsidies, Seeking New
Setup, N.Y. TamEs, July 25, 1994, at Al.
88. See generally GEORGE C. CoGGiNs & CHARLEs F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND REsouRcEs LAw 675-703 (1987); George C. Coggins, The Law
of Public Rangeland Management V: Prescriptions for Reform, 14 ENvTL. L.
497, 503 (1984). See also Elliot Diringer, New Babbitt Plan on Grazing Rules:
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ing lands for those intent on utilizing those resources for
grazing above those who wish to utilize the grasslands for
other uses (e.g., for scenic beauty, for hunting, or just for the
sake of their unspoiled existence).8 9 In urban localities, zon-
ing provides a similar result. Based on the dictates of the
community, certain land uses are supported while others are
deemed less desirable.90
These examples of environmental management policy de-
termination are not meant to suggest that such discrimina-
tion is unnecessary or bad, only that it occurs; the governing
body often has the ability and responsibility to manage the
community's environment regardless of whether it techni-
cally owns those resources.91 Furthermore, the examples are
meant to show that environmental management decisions
are political determinations. Managing a natural resource
means that a choice must be made as to how best to maximize
the objectives of the community with respect to that resource.
A problem may occur when the governance is too responsive
to the objectives of the community as a whole. Majoritarian-
ism may lead to a lack of protection of minority values and
needs.92 As in the example of zoning, if land use policy for a
city is determined wholly by popular referendum, then the
needs of minority landowners may well be sacrificed on the
altar of democracy. Without specific methods of ensuring pro-
tection for minority rights, groups that are underrepresented
in the governing body may systematically obtain a lesser
Ranchers, Environmentalists Would Work Out Standards Together, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 19, 1994, at A3; Timothy Egan, Sweeping Reversal of U.S. Land
Policy Sought by Clinton, N.Y. TuMEs, Feb. 24, 1993, at Al.
89. See CocGINs & WILKINSON, supra note 82, at 675-703.
90. See generally LEwis MUMFoRD, THE SoCiAL FouNDATIONs OF POsT-WAR
BUILDING (1943); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See also infra note 95.
91. A common criteria that governing bodies use to determine which parties
should benefit from environmental management is the ability to pay. For ex-
ample, governments sometimes manage recreational pursuits on public lands
by selling licenses to hunt. See COcGINS & WuIKNSON, supra note 82, at 852-
53. Similarly, government environmental regulation might work to impose
large start-up costs on potentially polluting industries. See supra note 36.
92. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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share of environmental benefits and thus become alienated
from the community.
The search for a new community in which to have one's
needs met is a reflection of dissatisfaction with a particular
governing philosophy and, to the extent that the governing
body is challenged by that movement, a threat to environ-
mental security. As outlined above,93 community unrest
might lead to an attempt to dissociate from the governing
body's control, at least with respect to management of the
natural resource in question, and pressure to force a redefini-
tion of the community's identity. In the intracommunity set-
ting, these pressures are often related; the movement of a
group of alienated individuals away from support of the gov-
erning body may result in an alteration of the identity of the
community. 94
1. Environmental Racism as an Example of an
Intracommunity-Motivated Threat to
Environmental Security
An example of the dynamic of an intracommunity-moti-
vated threat to environmental security is the set of issues
currently labelled "environmental racism."95 The term refers
to at least two connected conditions. 96 In 1987, the United
93. See discussion supra part H.B.I.c.
94. The rapidity with which an identity change might occur is correlated to
the governing philosophy of the community. Liberal democracies are well
known for institutionalizing the process of change. See, e.g., Richard B. Stew-
art, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 1537 (1983).
95. Some people prefer to use the less evocative phrases "environmental
justice issues" or "environmental classism" to refer to approximately the same
set of issues. I hope to stay away from that debate by claiming that the issues I
am particularly addressing here are those that have been correlated, in the cur-
rent discourse, with race. This is not an attempt to disagree with critics who
charge that racism is not the underlying social problem, but instead that clas-
sism is the culprit. There is certainly no attempt here to hierarchialize oppres-
sion. I hope to suggest, first by way of the metaphor here and soon after by
more specific parsing of the term, ways of conceptualizing the broader concept
of environmental "injustice" during the remainder of this article.
96. There is a growing body of literature on environmental racism issues.
Beyond the discourse suggested by the citations listed in the following dozen
footnotes, other scholarly discussions are underway. For example, one lawjour-
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Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice released one
of the first reports correlating toxic waste landfill siting in the
United States to the demographic proffle of the inhabitants of
the communities selected for the landfills. 97 Several similar
reports have followed,98 including a 1992 report conducted by
the National Law Journal that showed that federal environ-
mental laws were of disproportionately small benefit to mem-
bers of racial minority groups. 99 These reports generally
indicate that people with relatively low incomes and/or people
of color are more likely to have hazardous waste treatment
facilities sited in their neighborhoods than are members of
the population in general.' 00 The primary lesson of these
studies was not surprising to many who have worked with
land use questions in the past. Land use decision making,
including zoning,' 0 traditionally has been a function of local
nal recently published a special issue devoted entirely to these issues. 21 FORD-
HAM Uan. L.J. (1994). See also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in
Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103
YALE L.J. 1383 (1994); CONFRONTING EvioNM NAL RACISM: VOICES FROM
T=m GRASSRooTs (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); Michael Greenberg, Proving En-
vironmental Inequity in Siting Locally Unwanted Land Uses, 4 RISK - ISSUES IN
HEALTH & SAFYr 235 (1993); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It?
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental
Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L.
REv. 787 (1993).
97. CovhussioN FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL
AND SoCIO-EcoNOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIS wrrH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES (1987). An earlier report addressed the same topic. See U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THE CORRELATION
WrIH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
98. See also Kenneth J. Hollenbeck & Stephen J. Hudik, Green Justice:
Should the Poor Inherit the Polluted?, N.J.L.J., June 6, 1994, at Supp. 10.
99. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Di-
vide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. See also Edito-
rial, Environmental Justice, N.Y. Tams, Feb. 11, 1994, at A34.
100. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, 7
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE:
RACE, CLASS, AND ENVRONMENTAL QUALITY 1-6 (1990). But see Locally Unde-
sirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods, supra note 90, at n.2 .
101. It may be that some part of the cause of disproportionate locally unde-
sirable land use siting might come from underprotective zoning regulation. See
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
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community government; those parts of the community that
have greater amounts of money and power are more able to
block attempts to site disagreeable uses of the local land-
scape.10 2 The message that the charge of environmental ra-
cism carries is that members of politically less powerful
groups are exposed to greater risks from hazardous waste re-
lated problems than the overall population of the United
States, and are thus disproportionately carrying certain envi-
ronmental burdens of modern society.103
The second condition that falls under the broader head-
ing of environmental racism has to do with the fulfillment of
the promise of the environmental movement itself. The mod-
em vanguard of the movement-as reflected in the college-
educated, white, and relatively affluent members of the na-
tional environmental organizations-had continued to pro-
mote a primarily ecocentral agenda for the movement well
into the 1980s.104 In addition to equating an "environmen-
102. Indeed, politically vulnerable and economically depressed communities
are often offered minimal economic incentives for the use of their open space,
thus stamping the disproportionate environmental risks that these communi-
ties often accept with the imprimatur of a voluntary business deal. For exam-
ple, seven communities around the United States are now vying to become
storage sites for high-level nuclear wastes. Those communities that are actu-
ally selected to be nuclear depositories will receive millions of dollars in grants.
Keith Schneider, Grants Open Doors for Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Tzixs, Jan. 9,
1992, at A14. As a further example of a similar condition, there has been in-
creasing concern about the siting of hazardous waste landfills on the reserva-
tions of Native Americans. See, e.g., Len Hall, Ranchers Protest Planned
Landfill on Indian Reservation, L.A. T m, Aug. 25, 1992, at Bi; Thomas W.
Lippman, On Apache Homeland, Nuclear Waste Seen as Opportunity, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1992, at A3.
There is much debate over the specific mechanisms of environmental ra-
cism, see, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice" : The Dis-
tributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rav. 787, 807,
810-12, 820 (1993); CONFRONTING ENVIRONmmNTAL RACISM, supra note 90;
Been, supra note 90, at n.5. Few theorists have suggested that disproportionate
decision making does not exist.
103. Neocolonialism might be understood to be a similar type of environmen-
tal discrimination. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also CON-
FRONTING ENVIRoNmErAL RACISM, supra note 90, at 179-94; Bernard A.
Weintraub, Which Environment and What Law?, 6 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 259,
266-67 (1993).
104. See generally Claudia MacLachlan, Tension Underlies Rapport With
Grassroots Groups, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10; Renee Loth, Bringing
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tally desirable" quality of life to one which the United States'
increasingly urban, nonwhite population could hardly relate,
these groups continued to have a dearth of employees who
were members of racial minority groups in decision-making
roles.10 5 Such insularity suggested to many community lead-
ers that environmentalism was not a movement in which the
concerns of members of racial minority groups were welcome.
This concern recently precipitated a number of internal policy
alterations in the larger environmental organizations. 0 6
The two circumstances of environmental racism are re-
lated. They both suggest that when a minority group is de-
nied influence in community decision-making, members of
the group will become alienated from that community. The
attention devoted by the media, the government, and modern
environmentalists to the assertion of environmental racism
indicates that the charge is destabilizing. The increasingly
sophisticated discourse precipitated by the charge pressures
the targeted governing body to be accountable for the skewed
results of environmental management in practice. For exam-
ple, a recent Clinton Administration Executive Order re-
quires that:
each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations in the United States and its territories and
possessions .... 107
Earth Day Back Down to Earth; Grass-roots Activists Tweak 'Elitist' Brethren,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1991, at A33; Brad Knickerbocker, 'Green' is Not White,
CmusTiAN Sex. MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1990, at 13; John Lancaster, Role of Minorities
in Environmental Movement Remains Limited, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1990, at
A14.
105. See sources supra note 98.
106. For example, between 1990 and 1992, the Natural Resources Defense
Council increased the number of people of color on its staff from 14 to 35 out of a
total of 160; of those 35, nearly half were salaried staff. Building Bridges,
NRDC NEWSLInE, Apr. 1992, at 3.
107. Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 23, at 1-101.
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This initiative shows that these issues reflect a large enough
threat to security to warrant a response from the highest
levels of government.108
The charges of environmental racism against the large
environmental organizations lead to similar results. The ma-
jor environmental organizations constitute a special commu-
nity which also must respond to the charges. In so doing, the
identity of United States environmentalism is altered. 10 9
Furthermore, new environmental organizations, many of
which reflect the demographics of the communities in which
they operate, have come into being in the recent past. 1 0 The
existence of these groups suggests that a minority population
may both work to redefine the identity of the broader commu-
nity in which it exists, and at the same time, formulate new
communities to meet its specific needs.
2. An Environmental Justice
The occurrence of environmental racism suggests that
the environmental needs of the less powerful members of a
community may, in many ways, become subordinated to the
needs of the powerful. A pattern of environmental manage-
ment which systematically selects against one group of com-
munity members without a reasonable policy rationale-such
as that described by the charge of environmental racism-
might be called environmental discrimination. The continu-
ance of such bias is a threat to environmental security.
Because maintaining environmental security is a goal of
every community, a lack of institutionalized checks on the
abuses of power is an indication of that community's convic-
tions about both individuals' rights and environmental man-
108. See also John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton to Order Pollution Policy
Cleared of Bias, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al; Environmental Justice, supra
note 93.
109. See, e.g., Building Bridges, supra note 100.
110. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S10; Steve Schneider, Environmental Racism? Residents Say Sewage
Plant 'Ravages' Community, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 21; Ronald A. Tay-
lor, Ecological Front Shifts to Inner City, WASH. TAMns, Apr. 20, 1990, at H2.
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agement.1-11  Indeed, because the definitions of natural
resources, environment and, ultimately, environmental se-
curity, are so intertwined with the community's self-percep-
tion with respect to the benefits and services the community
allocates to individuals, the entire discussion of environmen-
tal security is strongly informed by concepts of justice.
Justice is a construct used to describe the community-de-
termined, proper way for a governing body to treat individu-
als. Each community includes some concept of justice in its
identity. Because the context of the discussion in this article
is people's relationship with their environment, and because
a community's environment is a web of connections to natural
resources originating both inside and outside of the commu-
nity in question, environmental security can only make sense
if there exists a common basis for the just management of the
environment. I refer to this broader conception of justice as
"environmental justice."112
At its foundation, environmental justice promotes equal-
ity of the benefits of environmental management within a
given community.113 This position could follow from Rawls'
conception of an original position in which all members of a
justice-defining community find themselves behind a veil of
111. This formulation does not attempt to suggest that the governing body
need respond to the demands of every community member in every case. See
supra note 24. However, certain institutionalized responses might be necessary
to ensure that the rights of community members are protected. See discussion
infra section III.D.
112. There are many concepts described as "environmental justice" in the
literature. See sources cited at supra notes 90-104. I will leave it for another
day to examine those constructs in greater detail. It is necessary for me to for-
mulate at least a cursory notion of the concept here because a comprehensive
theory of environmental security relies on common concepts of justice which
must be described in a commonly accepted context.
113. Rawls' endeavor was to define a system ofjustice within a given commu-
nity. Thus, much of the criticism of Rawls with respect to international law has
to do with his failure to discuss in detail the "international" community-
whether it be composed of states that are synonymous to individuals in a do-
mestic justice system, or of individuals that might have obligations to some
global community. See generally CH.ARLES R. BErrz, POLricAL THEORY AND IN-
TERNATIoNAL RELATIONS 125-76 (1979).
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ignorance.1 14 While Rawls' own original position is some-
what problematic,115 it is still possible that general principles
of justice, especially as they relate to community-defined nor-
mative goals, can be forged from a contractarian point of
view. Once again following Rawls, there should be a caveat
to this general goal of equal benefit. Equality must be main-
tained "unless an unequal distribution of any or all... goods
is to the advantage of the least favored."116 This exception is
specified in what Rawls calls the difference principle: that
"[slocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least ad-
vantaged . . ., and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."11 7 The
inclusion of a qualification such as the difference principle in
a theory of environmental justice is one way to safeguard
against environmental discrimination.
This Rawlsian skeleton is the beginning of a model of en-
vironmental justice that might support a unified theory of en-
vironmental security. What the outline lacks is the flesh of
modern environmental morality and politics. As this article
continues to parse environmental security, I will attempt to
add to the model of environmental justice. This will be done
114. Rawls' conceptions of justice rely on an "original position" wherein all
those who will determine the principles ofjustice for the given community make
that determination behind a "veil of ignorance." JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). This original position is one where:
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status,
nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like....
[Piarties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities.
Id. at 12.
115. This is so primarily because I do not think it properly accounts for in-
tercommunity and intertemporal relationships. See BErrz, supra note 107, for a
thorough discussion of where Rawls fails with respect to international applica-
tions of his own theory. See also Brent A. Singer, An Extension of Rawls' Theory
of Justice to Environmental Ethics, 10 J. ENvrL. ETHmCS 217 (1988). Singer ar-
gues that being behind the veil of ignorance should mean that parties in the
original position must be unaware as to which present or future generation they
belong.
116. RAwLS, supra note 107, at 303.
117. Id. at 302.
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by refining the definition of MQE stated above in section
II.A.2. By such refinement, I hope to show that there is a
series of criteria that all communities internalize, or should
internalize, as goals of environmental management in an ef-
fort to maximize environmental security.
B. The Local Community
The primary community with which most people associ-
ate is the one that most impacts their lives: the one in which
they live. Such communities are frequently municipalities,
but they might also be less formal governance arrange-
ments.118 For this community, as all others, an MQE exists
that reflects the community-specific environmental manage-
ment for which the governing body is responsible. 119 In the
United States, the local governing body is most conspicuously
responsible for creating and enforcing a local land use policy,
providing municipal services such as provision of park areas
and solid waste removal, promoting the local economy, and
frequently ensuring some level of access to environmental
management decision making.
It might be argued that the political dynamics of local
communities are too insignificant in the larger context of
modern national politics to be called a threat to any recogniz-
able form of environmental security. Indeed, local communi-
ties are often very similar, and their common concerns might
be addressed by broader governmental policy mechanisms. 20
If this is so, then the broader governmental policy mecha-
nisms reflect the governing body of the most local community
118. See, e.g., infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
119. The local governing body is not usually responsible for directing all en-
vironmental management policies that affect each community member's life.
Only in rare cases will the local government be responsible, for example, for the
economic policies that allow raw materials to flow in and out of the country in
which the local community exists. Furthermore, many environmental laws are
administered on the domestic government level. See discussion infra section
mI.C.
120. For example, if all towns in a given county have similar land use needs
and desires, then zoning and park management might well proceed on the
county or even domestic level. In this case, the 'township level" community
fails to have any meaning with respect to environmental security.
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that exists for the sake of managing the natural resource in
question. 21 The role of a local governing body is not negated.
Also, the analysis of environmental security undertaken here
is limited to the effects of the instability of the community
itself. Whether intracommunity-motivated threats to envi-
ronmental security are linked to intercommunity concerns
will be taken up later.122
Because the local community so directly impacts people's
lives, it is in this forum that attempts to translate identity
into policy are most open to scrutiny and failures to meet the
goals defined by the MQE are most resented. Consequently,
charges of environmental discrimination are often leveled
first against the policies and management of the governing
body of the local environment. Because intracommunity-mo-
tivated challenges to environmental security often involve
seeming failures to manage the environment equitably, at-
tempts to maintain environmental security often entail the
governing body's attempts to justify or alter a management
policy or to redefine what reasonably should be deemed equi-
table with respect to environmental management.
As mentioned above, local land use policy such as zoning
may provide a context for the environmental discrimination
that might precipitate a threat to the environmental security
of the local community. Examples of this often are seen in
the siting of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs). Such
uses include solid waste transfer stations, solid waste incin-
erators, industrial processing plants that are associated with
hazardous chemical use, sewage treatment plants, public-
need facilities such as shelters for the homeless, policy-man-
dated low-income housing, mental hospitals, and other facili-
ties that might be disagreeable to the local community. 2 3
The siting of LULUs is often a function of the local gov-
erning body, which creates a land use policy according to the
perceived best interest of the community. However, the
121. At some point the scope of government functions is so large that it can-
not be called local. See discussion infra section 11.C regarding these larger,
domestic communities.
122. See discussion infra parts IV and V.
123. See sources listed at supra note 90.
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majoritarian interest of the community might lead to specific
groups in that society bearing more risks associated with cer-
tain land uses than others. For example, while it is necessary
for some LULUs to be sited in a community as large as New
York City, some neighborhoods house a greater per capita
share of LULUs than others. It has long been acknowledged
that the Greenpoint neighborhood of Brooklyn houses a dis-
proportionate share of such sites.1 24 While there appears to
be no intentional discrimination against the residents of
Greenpoint, there must be some bias in the process of site
selection that has lead to systematic placement of health
risks and land-use burdens in one geographical location. In
opposition to what they perceive to be environmental discrim-
ination, residents of Greenpoint have organized groups such
as the Concerned Citizens of Greenpoint and Greenpoint
Against Smell and Pollution.1 25 These groups have lead a
campaign to increase awareness about the residents' plight,
as well as to motivate the appropriate regulatory agencies to
recognize the inequity of the situation and to ameliorate the
threats. 2 6
Community members who crave space and see old water-
fronts wasted by lack of upkeep or outdated uses, 2 7 or see
124. Greenpoint is home to facilities that use, process, and store hazardous
chemicals; solid waste transfer stations; a city-owned garbage incinerator; a
city-owned sewage treatment plant; and a vast underground oil spill. The area
is also bordered and crossed by a number of major highways. See Joseph R.
Lentol, Letter to the Editor: Let's Make a Start on Environmental Justice with
Brooklyn, N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 25, 1994, at A28; Manuel Perez-Rivas, Pollution
Study Is Muddy Issue, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1992, at 5; Elizabeth Kolbert,
Mobil to Pay Millions to Clean Up Vast Pool of Oil Beneath Brooklyn, N.Y.
TimFs, July 10, 1990, at Al; Curtis Rist, A Solemn Earth Day in Brooklyn; Resi-
dents Side by Side with Danger, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1990, at 6.
125. See, e.g., Merle English, Airing a Big Stink On Earth Day Eve; Film-
maker Shows Greenpoint's Toxic Troubles, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 21, 1993, at 33;
Rist, supra note 118.
126. See supra note 119. See also William Bunch, Brooklyn Cancer Up;
Among City's Highest Rates, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 22, 1992, at 3; Perez-Rivas,
supra note 118.
127. See Alix Biel, Old Saybrook Pier Focus of Anger, HARTFORD COUm R,
Aug. 31, 1994, at Bi; Shelley Neumeier, Park Developer Plants Plan for Green
Hudson, CRAm's N.Y. Bus., Sept. 21-27, 1992, at 13.
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open land made unusable by drugs and pollution,128 may or-
ganize to change these "unacceptable" natural resource uses.
Even when the group of people organizing such crusades is
not the whole of the community, the grassroots attempt to
alter environmental policy may alter community identity. In
the example above, as the people of Greenpoint became aware
and then concerned about their exposure to various environ-
mental toxins, they began to organize. If their protest is
deemed a great enough threat to the environmental security
of the community, the governing body will be influenced by
the protesters to alter its policies.
The process of restoring or ensuring environmental se-
curity in the local community is one primarily of responding
to environmental discrimination. While protest is often a
useful way to eventuate change in environmental manage-
ment, active community introspection might save the commu-
nity, and the governing body in particular, from the
disruptions of social unrest. While there is no space here to
discuss various processes of institutional learning and devel-
opment, this process would be part of the process of commu-
nity education and ethic building mentioned above in section
II.B.2. Even when such formal introspection is not occurring,
a governing body might be educated by the organizing that
goes on in communities. In New York City, many environ-
mental organizations have come into being or have gained
stature in the recent past.129 Such groups are beneficial for
the community because they act as a register of community
dissatisfaction on specific issues, they provide information to
the community about specific issues, and they educate the
community as to the need to reformulate its identity to in-
clude a more inclusive MQE.130
128. See Iver Peterson, A No Man's Land Thrives As Everyone's Garden, N.Y.
TatEs, Apr. 30, 1993, at B5.
129. Examples include Greenpoint Against Smell and Pollution, West Har-
lem Environmental Action, Transportation Alternatives, the Environmental
Action Coalition, the Brooklyn Greens, the Green Guerrillas, the Greening of
Harlem Coalition, the Environmental Education Action Coalition, and the New
York City Environmental Justice Alliance.
130. See generally discussion supra section II.B.2.
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The result of community environmental education and
social instability is a reassessment of the environmental
management of the community. While the ability to actually
provoke change is a function of the community's identity, the
goal remains to make the governing body at least responsive
to the environmental needs of the people.
C. The Domestic Community
The environmental management engaged in by the local
governing body directly affects community members' quality
of life. However, many of the natural resources on which peo-
ple rely are managed by governing bodies of communities
that cannot easily be categorized as local. This larger com-
munity-usually labelled a country or a state131-is the do-
mestic community. Citizens of a country rely on the
governing body of the domestic community for the manage-
ment of certain natural resources; they rely on their local
community's governing body for the management of
others. 13 2 The governing bodies of both communities are re-
sponsible to each person to ensure that her or his quality of
life is consonant with that defined as appropriate within the
identity of both communities.133
131. The political structure of most modern countries includes governing
bodies at the country and local levels. Many modern countries also have an
intermediate, or provincial, level of governance. In the United States, there are
such regional governments which govern entities confusingly called "states."
Thus, when I discuss the United States, I may refer to the governing body of
states that are not coincident with the governing body of the United States'
domestic community.
132. Of course, people are community members, at least for the sake of natu-
ral resource management, at each level on which natural resources are man-
aged. The existence of self-governing states in the United States allow there to
be at least three levels of communities to which each citizen is a member. It
could even be argued that because some natural resources are managed on the
county level in the United States (e.g., certain park lands), United States citi-
zeus are members of at least four political communities.
133. Of course, the MQE of the domestic community might be thought of as a
baseline; the local community's MQE would include environmental manage-
ment at least as protective as that of the broader (and less specific) domestic
community.
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1. Domestic Environmental Discrimination
Similar to the concerns at the local level, domestic level
environmental management may become a vehicle of discrim-
ination if majoritarian impulses are not checked. For exam-
ple, the first modern version of the Clean Air Act (CAA)134
appeared to permit all states to establish their State Imple-
mentation Plan (SIP) control strategies based on a single set
of national pollutant standards, regardless of the existing
levels of pollution within each state.1 35 This resulted in a se-
ries of SIPs approved by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency that, in effect, allowed polluting industries
to degrade the quality of air in areas which previously had
relatively clean air. 36 When the CAA was amended in 1977,
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program was ad-
ded 37 to ensure that the air quality in less-industrialized ar-
eas did not suffer for the ills of the overdeveloped areas.' 38
Similar to the local environmental context, the governing
body of the domestic community often must be prodded into
ensuring equal management of the environment for all com-
munity members.
Beyond the CAA example, there are many incidents of
domestic environmental management that have resulted in
charges of environmental discrimination. Beginning in the
late 1980s, attention began to be focused on the dispropor-
tionate risk burden Native Americans were beginning to as-
sume by allowing the siting of hazardous waste sites on their
reservations. 139 Such siting might be thought of as environ-
134. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
135. See, 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (1970).
136. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd
without opinion, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an
equally divided court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
137. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685, 731 (1977) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. pt. C, §§ 7470-7492(f) (1994)).
138. In part, this amendment was a response to a series of decisions that
held that the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality was part of
the original mandate of the CAA See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
at 256.
139. Most of these siting decisions may be said to occur at the national level
because of the unique status of Native American reservations within the United
States government. Native American reservations are considered separate na-
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mental discrimination because it takes advantage of the fact
that Native Americans are often unable to turn away the in-
centives of hazardous waste disposal because of their commu-
nity's poverty.140
Disproportionate allocation of national park funding to
parks located in areas where relatively few people directly
benefit from them might be another example of environmen-
tal discrimination. Some people have recently questioned
why Gateway National Park, in the New York City Metropol-
itan area-annually serving twice as many visitors as
Yosemite National Park in California-receives a quarter
less funding than Yosemite.141 To the extent that people in
areas of the United States who do not directly benefit from
equitable funding for national parks feel that the inequity is
not a reasonable interpretation of the United States identity,
and are willing to say so, the environmental security of the
United States is threatened. Similarly, farmers in California
are protesting that state government's recent decision to allo-
cate less water to irrigation and more water to places that
benefit conservation and the fishing industry.142 While there
might be good reasons why such policy determinations are
made, calling attention to the discrepancy forces the commu-
nity to justify the inequity, thus refining and strengthening
its identity.
These examples suggest that intracommunity-motivated
threats to environmental security are similar in cause and ef-
fect at the domestic and local levels. Also similar are the
methods that a responsive governing body should undertake
to address these challenges. Because threats to environmen-
tions from the United States for many environmental regulatory purposes. See
Craighton Goeppele, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the Reserva-
tion Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989), 65 WASH. L. Rav. 417 (1990); Washing-
ton Dep't of Ecology v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 752
F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
140. See Schneider, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
141. See Michael Specter, City Dwellers Want U.S. Park Funds to Go East,
N.Y. TmIEs, July 27, 1992, at Al.
142. David Margolick, As Drought Looms, Farmers in California Blame Poli-
tics, N.Y. ThmS, June 24, 1994, at Al.
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tal security are often attempts to change the community's
identity in ways that make the MQE more inclusive of the
needs of people discriminated against by community policy,
the community must be ready to identify and respond to its
biases. Therefore, education is a necessary part of respond-
ing to threats to environmental security; community mem-
bers must become educated in the processes and policies of
environmental management. This education, both formal
and informal, will help to create a population willing to en-
sure that the governing body provides an MQE that is accept-
able to all people. 143 The learning process also affords the
governing body with opportunities to create or amend policy
to best reflect environmental justice as the community per-
ceives it. In the United States, a recent increase in the
number of grassroots environmental groups is a broad socie-
tal response to perceived environmental discrimination.
President Clinton's recent Executive Order emphasizing the
need to counter environmental injustice'" is perhaps a simi-
lar social barometer.
2. Threats to National Security
Of course, traditional notions of national security-
where security is defined primarily as a country's prepared-
ness to protect itself from aggression-frequently are also
considered the responsibility of the domestic governing body.
Such responsibility can include certain types of environmen-
tal security. Since at least the end of the Cold War, there has
been some discussion of categorizing certain types of environ-
mental degradation as threats to national security. 45 These
threats take many shapes. They could be direct threats to
143. See discussion supra section H.B.2. Many organizations devoted to
these ideals now exist. For example, in New York City the Christodora Founda-
tion and the Environmental Education Action Coalition are just two of the
groups devoted to educating children about environmental science and issues.
Other organizations, such as the Environmental Action Coalition and the New
York chapter of the National Audubon Society, have broader agendas which
include promoting environmental awareness.
144. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
145. See Environment Now International Issue, supra note 3; Oppenheimer,
supra note 3; Lewis, supra note 3.
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preparedness, such as the realization that it will require
enormous diversions of money and effort to remediate the nu-
merous hazardous waste sites that the United States military
has created at its many military bases.146 They can come
from the knowledge that the country's environmental poli-
cies, while benefitting citizens in the short term, may weaken
the country's strategic position in the long term.147 They can
even come from the vast resources and efforts it will take to
respond to environmental degradation in less-industrialized
countries if help is not forwarded now to help develop envi-
ronmental management in those countries. 48
It is this more traditional understanding of domestic se-
curity that appears to have moved President Clinton to estab-
lish the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for
Environmental Security.1 49 According to the new Undersec-
retary of Defense for Environmental Security, the goals of the
Environmental Security Program are to ensure that the De-
partment of Defense (DoD): complies with environmental
laws; cleans up and reduces risk from contaminated DoD
sites; is a responsible steward of DoD land; prevents pollution
at the source whenever possible; promotes environmentally
benign technologies; and protects the safety and health of
both the military and civilians. 150 This new focus "incorpo-
rate[s] sound environmental practices into DoD's operations
in order to protect the environment and avoid future
costs."1 5 1
146. See Robert Bryce, Spit-and-Polish Military Looks at Its Own Big
Messes, CmusTIAN SCI. MONrrOR, June 14, 1994, at 3; White House Announces
Formation of Interagency Cleanup Policy Group, Natl Env't Daily (BNA), May
11, 1994; Gary Lee, 'Green" War Waged at Pentagon Amid Military Drab, L.A.
Tms, May 1, 1994, at A33.
147. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, After 20 Years, America's Foot Is Still On
the Gas, N.Y. Tnns, Oct. 17, 1993, at E4.
148. See Oppenheimer, supra note 3; Lewis, supra note 3.
149. See Senate Appropriations Hearing on FY95 Defense Appropriations,
(Testimony of Sherri Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense), 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Senate Appropriations Hearing]; Lee, supra
note 140.
150. Senate Appropriations Hearing, supra note 149.
151. Id.
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Much of what has been called "environmental terrorism"
can also be understood to be a threat to domestic environ-
mental security in the more traditional sense. For example,
during the late 1980s, a guerrilla group in Colombia at-
tempted to undermine the authority of the government by re-
peatedly blowing up the nation's largest oil pipeline, spilling
more than 600,000 gallons of oil into east Andes wetlands.152
At least from the Kuwaiti point of view, Iraq's attack on
Kuwaiti oil wells and wetlands was a direct challenge to the
governing body's authority and ability to control natural re-
sources within the parameters of Kuwait. Such challenges
almost always would be seen, at least by the governing body,
as threats to environmental security.153
D. Refining MQE to Recognize Intracommunity Aspects of
Environmental Security
Because most people rely on at least two governing bod-
ies to ensure different aspects of their quality of environ-
ment-those associated with the local and domestic
communities-the governing bodies at both levels of govern-
ment need to be clear about which natural resources will be
managed by which governing body. The process of drawing
boundaries between the obligations of the different communi-
ties is one of social and political evolution; as each commu-
nity's environmental management responsibilities are
included in that community's identity, a domestic culture en-
compassing all of the local communities' and the domestic
community's identities is forged.154 This domestic culture re-
152. See James Brooke, Colombia Rebels Turn to Ecological Terrorism, N.Y.
TrA, Oct. 29, 1990, at A8.
153. See Tod Robberson, Mexicans Rage Over Pollution; Injury of 10-Year-
Old Draws Out Protesters, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1993, at A10; Judge Uses Rul-
ing on Rice Mill to Assail Environmental Terrorism, Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA),
July 15, 1992 at 474; Existing Ground Water Program Authority May Be Suffi-
cient, EPA Administrator Says, Env't Rep. (BNA), Feb. 2, 1990, at 1710.
154. In the United States, where the federation supports shared responsibil-
ity between the federal and state governments, the interplay of obligation has
been examined in detail. Interpretations of the United States Constitution in
case law (at least from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), through Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 63 (1938)), in legislation, and in public understand-
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flects the obligation that the society as a whole feels towards
providing a certain quality of environment to every member
of that society.
The result of domestic culture building is that the iden-
tity of each community includes a reliance on a division of
responsibility for community members' well-being. Specifi-
cally as it relates to environmental management, each com-
munity's MQE includes deference to the other relevant
community's right to manage certain natural resources. The
enactment of national environmental laws seeks to codify this
process. For example, the CAA divides responsibility for
managing the United States' air resources between the fed-
eral government and the states; the federal government is re-
sponsible for setting the standards to be met by each state,155
while the states are responsible to achieve those goals by es-
tablishing SIPs.' 56 Most communities, therefore, are part of
federated systems that function to ensure an adequate qual-
ity of environment for each community member. A properly
structured federation, as mentioned in section II.A. .b. above,
may allow proper representation without trampling on the
rights of those who are not of the majority. Beyond this nec-
essary goal, federated systems, because they may effectively
reflect both local interests and national unity, can be empow-
ering for domestic society as a whole.' 57
In summary, a governing body wishing to ensure envi-
ronmental security must do at least two things. First, it must
seek to promote community-appropriate, environmentally-
just environmental management. This goal is achieved by
engaging in a learning process that includes being sensitive
to the concerns of the representatives of nonmajoritarian
ing, has delimited which community's rights are the most relevant in a given
situation.
155. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
157. For example, the environmental movement in the United States has
benefitted greatly from its diversity as well as its unity on many issues. This
important mix of characteristics has led to a situation where political coalitions
can relatively easily be formed, and internal differences in opinion can both be
put aside when necessary as well as used to spur greater refinement of argu-
ments and ideals.
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groups within the community and then altering the environ-
mentally discriminatory policies of the community to protect
the needs of all community members. Second, the governing
body must internalize the ramifications of operating within a
realm of federated environmental management. This means
that it will have to engage in a process of identity refinement
that potentially includes ceding some of its governing respon-
sibility to another governing body.
Each community's MQE is the threshold against which
community members judge the extent to which they are being
treated in a way consonant with the identity of the commu-
nity. Because each community attempts to maximize its en-
vironmental security, the two lessons gleaned from this part
might be used to refine the definition of MQE in the following
way:
The Minimum Quality of Environment (MQE) is the
amount and type of benefits of environmental management
that must be maintained for a given community to main-
tain its identity. This measurement reflects an effort to in-
crease the well-being of community members within that
identity by achieving community-appropriate, environmen-
tally-just environmental management, and by ceding envi-
ronmental management responsibility to other
communities, when such ceding would be in the commu-
nity's best interest.
This definition of MQE more specifically outlines the pres-
sure points that might lead to threats to the environmental
security of a community. It also emphasizes that maintain-
ing environmental security is closely tied to promoting jus-
tice. As long as environmental discrimination exists within a
community, there is a potential threat to that community's
environmental security. When the community manages its
environment for the well being of all of its members in a
nondiscriminating way, then the community recognizes and
promotes community-based environmental justice.
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IV. Intercommunity Aspects of Environmental
Security
As long as some of the community's natural resources
originate from outside of the community, the maintenance of
environmental security will be greatly influenced by factors
beyond the complete control of the governing body. This lack
of control makes the governing body of any community that is
dependent on a foreign source of natural resources also vul-
nerable to instability.158
There are primarily two contexts in which governing bod-
ies respond to the vulnerability caused by potentially unas-
sured flows of intercommunity natural resources. If the
community in question is part of a federated system of com-
munities, such as would be one state of the United States,
there may be a larger context of law that governs intercom-
munity environmental management. In this case, the com-
munities theoretically have established an equilibrium of
responsibility for environmental management that operates
within the context described in section III.C. But, as men-
tioned above, even in a federated regime certain natural re-
sources are managed at a more local level; even smaller
communities within larger political entities 59 may have in-
tercommunity needs. 160
The other context in which modern governing bodies en-
gage in intercommunity relations with respect to environ-
mental management is international relations. While it
might be argued that the presence of international law effec-
158. See generally discussion supra part II.
159. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. Given the definition of
community, two communities may exist within a larger community. Even in
this case, the smaller communities are still responsible for maintaining the
community-specific MQE of their members.
160. Conceptually, a community that makes up a component of a federated
community would have some (perhaps most) of its traditional environmental
management needs met by the larger community. However, the kinds of natu-
ral resources to which the local governing body must ensure access in order to
promote the community's identity may well include some over which the local
governing body has little control. Thus, part of the community's identity would
be determined by the ability of the governing body to ensure access to natural
resources that originate outside of its borders.
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tively creates a federation of nations, and the two contexts
just mentioned are actually one, the differences between in-
ternational and federated systems of governance are great
enough to ensure that the parallel is not a complete one.161
Indeed, the unique considerations of international relations
have precipitated a jurisprudence the scope of which ranges
from realist visions of discrete, self-focused, Hobbesian coun-
tries,162 to those of state moralists, institutionalists, and
cosmopolitanists.163
While various theorists assert differing descriptions of
how communities interact in a world characterized by the in-
creasing economic interdependence of all types of communi-
ties164 and by transboundary environmental degradation, 65
it is necessary to determine whether such interaction in-
cludes intercommunity obligations with respect to environ-
mental management. If such obligations exist, then a
credible theory of environmental security should describe the
role of such obligation within each community's identity.
A. The Relevance of Environmental Security to
Traditional Intercommunity Relations
If each community's environment was based on natural
resources solely acquired from within its own parameters of
control, then a fully empowered governing body might be able
161. A federation presumes an overarching governing body; the lack of such
a body is a well-recognized characteristic of international law. See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1293
(1985); Louis Henkin, The Politics of Law Observance, in How NATIONS BEHAVE
39 (2d ed., 1979). However, to say that the parallel will never be complete is not
the same as saying that it is impossible to judge the legitimacy of various forms
of government. For an interesting discussion of this question, see generally LEA
BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989). See also FRANCic, supra
note 52.
162. See generally MICHAEL J. SmTrH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO
KISSINGER (1990).
163. Cosmopolitanists downplay or dispute the importance of state bounda-
ries. Instead, they tend to rely on the existence of a "group" that provides con-
text to interpersonal morality. See Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. PHIL.
173 (1982).
164. See generally Jim MACNEILL ET AL., BEYOND INTERDEPENDENCE: THE
MESHING OF THE WoRLD's ECONOMY AND THE EARTi's ECOLOGY (1991).
165. See discussion infra section IV.B.1.
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to completely control the community's environmental man-
agement. However, few communities are natural resource
self-sufficient; most governing bodies are beholden to factors
beyond their control to ensure the quality of the community's
environment. 166
Furthermore, beyond the simple acquisition of natural
resources, a community's MQE is based in part on aspira-
tional, practical, and exploitative intercommunity interac-
tion. A community's MQE may be informed by the aspiration
to have a standard of living similar to that of another commu-
nity. Other interactions between communities could be called
practical considerations. To facilitate and ensure the contin-
ued importation of natural resources, the community needs to
maintain relations with other communities that will allow
this objective. 167 Some interactions between communities,
with respect to environmental management, might be ex-
ploitative.168 These are situations where one community
uses political or economic power to take natural resources
from another community against the originating commu-
nity's will.1 69 The result of such interactions between com-
munities might be the shifting of one community's MQE
towards a standard that cannot be achieved within the com-
166. See discussion supra section I.A.l.b.
167. In the international context, this might include the maintenance of
"kriendly nation" treaties, such as treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion. The United States is a party to over two dozen treaties that recognize
such obligations, see, e.g., Treaty, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, U.S.-Israel,
art. VII(1), 5 U.S.T. 550, 558; Treaty, Aug. 3 - Dec. 26, 1951, U.S.-Greece, art.
XII(4), 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1857.
168. The line between reasonable and exploitative community interactions is
not a clear one. While there is not room here to join the important debate over
the extent to which intercommunity morality is affected by "cultural relativ-
ism," see infra note 181, it is reasonable to conclude that the line between rea-
sonable and exploitative community interactions is in large part determined by
the governing philosophy of the community making the determination.
169. In the international context, this description parallels some colonial
practices, see, e.g., Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Miscon-
duct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598
(1990); Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western and
Third World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 n.26 (1983),
and even some practices associated with neocolonialism. See supra note 31.
[Vol. 12
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munity's current economic or political organization. This sit-
uation may pose a direct threat to environmental security. 170
Given the potential for intercommunity influences to
threaten environmental security, it is reasonable to conclude
that intercommunity interactions might implicate shared re-
sponsibility. There might be two reasons why one community
would feel an obligation towards promoting or maintaining
the environmental well-being of another community: (1) the
first community might believe that to promote another com-
munity's environmental security is the best way to assure its
own access to natural resources; and (2) the first community
might believe it has a normative responsibility to aid the
other community. The motivation for the former reason is
fairly clear, but the basis for the second is more difficult to
fathom.
B. Expanding the Description of Environmental Security
to Account for Intercommunity Obligation
Because environmental security has been defined in this
article primarily in the context of a single community's needs,
the self-promoting aspects of intercommunity relations ap-
pear to be obvious bases of intercommunity obligations. How-
ever, there may be other motivations for obligations to arise
between communities. For example, beyond self-promotion,
the most obvious compulsion for behavior is moral responsi-
bility. Recently there has arisen a jurisprudence of interna-
tional relations that addresses the possibility of
intercommunity moral obligation. 171 This discourse has in-
170. Such instability is sometimes seen in border problems between commu-
nities that have disparate MQEs. For example, illegal immigration flowing
from natural resource-poor to natural resource-rich countries often can be at-
tributed to disparate standards of living. While illegal immigration may result
in instability in the natural resource-poor state, it may precipitate instability in
the resource-rich country as well. See, e.g., John Aloysius Farrell, Open Doors/
Closing Minds, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1992, at 61; Seth Mydans, Border Near
San Diego is Home to More Violence, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1991, at A20.
171. "Morality" usually refers to the obligations of individuals towards each
other. One school of international jurisprudence-the so-called state moral-
ists-analogize state actors to individuals, thus identifying an international
morality that is presumed to be analytically equivalent to individual morality.
The importance of state morality will be discussed at infra section IV.B.2.b.
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tensified in recent years due to the increasing awareness, and
consequent concern, about human rights violations and envi-
ronmental degradation. Because this article is concerned
with the allocational equity of natural resources, the argu-
ment here makes one of the necessary linkages between these
two concerns.
1. Why a Basis for Intercommunity Obligation is
Difficult to Discern
Because the social compulsion that usually gives rise to
obligations seems to be lacking in the intercommunity con-
text, the basis for intercommunity obligation is not obvious.
Perhaps the most widely recognized context for estab-
lishing obligation is the law. Legal obligation is based on the
dictates of government backed by police power; traditionally,
law is effective to the extent that it is backed by coercion
feared by all relevant parties. However, this legal positivism
relegates obligation to the government's political bounda-
ries.172 Positivists would claim that the boundaries of the
communities addressed in this article approximate the scope
of the community members' legal responsibility.17 3 Even the
existence of a contract, which might provide an exception to
legal positivism by allowing the dynamic of mutual benefit to
substitute as a basis for obligation, assumes the presence of
supervening law.17 4 Even though many theorists believe that
172. For a description of the basis of positivist thought see ANTHONY
D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DEsCRnrIvE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW
118-22 (1984); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORA=IY
37-77 (1979); H.LA. Hart, "Legal Positivism," in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY 418 (P. Edwards ed., 1967).
173. Of course, this is true only to the extent that communities do not enter
into legal relationships within the rubric of larger legal entities. Communities
that are members of federal systems may have legal obligations to "peer" com-
munities. In this situation there is not an absence of "law," because all parties
accept a single system of governing norms.
174. Contracts between members of different communities are legitimate to
the extent that the communities are part of a federation governed by enforcea-
ble legal norms which provide for the interpretation and enforcement of con-
tracts. It is because there is no comprehensive enforcement mechanism in the
international context that contracts between residents of different countries
must clearly specify which law governs the interpretation of the document. And
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the basis of legal obligation is not so clearly dependent on a
power model of government, 175 it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that the lack of traditional enforcement mechanisms
makes intercommunity legal obligations fundamentally dif-
ferent from intracommunity obligations. This is not to sug-
gest that intercommunity obligations are not relevant or
compelling; it is only to accept that legal compulsion may not
greatly aid this attempt to find a context for a broad in-
tercommunity obligation.
The positivist suggestion that legal responsibility fails to
exist where there is no compulsion is most strongly asserted
with respect to international relations. 7 6 As opposed to fed-
erated systems, there are few obligation-enforcing interna-
tional institutions 77 that can compel many communities or
businesses to cede power to them in return for the supposed
benefits of affiliation. 178 Even the United Nations system,
which holds promise for promoting many environmental
ideals, would have great difficulty relying on the Security
Council's enforcement power to stop environmental degrada-
tion.179 As a consequence, despite the obvious benefits of pro-
even when contracts do so specify, enforcement is not as assured as it is in the
domestic or local context.
175. See citations supra note 155.
176. It is in part for this reason that international relationships are the most
difficult intercommunity context in which to ensure access to natural resources.
Other reasons international relationships may present unique problems for in-
tercommunity environmental management are examined at the discussion
supra section H.B.
177. There has been some movement since its chartering in 1945 to vest in
the United Nations formal enforcement powers. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
11, and U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 6. Currently, however, the United Nations
system operates pursuant to a loose social contract that allows the world body
to remain involved in international affairs only to the extent that its objectives
and activities do not diminish the strength and sovereignty of its members.
178. While it is certainly true that trade partners may work together for long
enough to forge trust, it is understood that each such partnership must be
forged anew. The most recent round of negotiations in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade is but one example of the difficulty of forging any type of
unified system in the face of state self-interest. See Tom Walker, U.S. Fails to
Make Progress in Trade Talks with Europe, Tim Tnmcs (London), Sept. 2, 1992,
(Business). See also John Yochelson & Amy Kaslow, The Jobs Challenge of the
World's Rich Countries, WAsH. Q., Autumn 1994, at 123.
179. See Tinker, supra note 3.
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moting prudent environmental management, international
discourse has traditionally relegated environmental concerns
to a secondary status.1s0
Of course, a legal system is only one manifestation of
community. Responsibility may arise from various systems
instituted to meet common needs and objectives. The goal,
therefore, becomes to determine whether any such system
has developed. Unless a recognized system of common needs
and objectives can be discerned or formulated, intercom-
munity relations will be relegated to contractual relation-
ships narrowly premised on compulsion and doubt.
2. International Jurisprudence
Because the international context may be the most diffi-
cult one in which to ascertain intercommunity responsibility,
it is here that a basis for intercommunity environmental re-
sponsibility must be proven. International jurisprudence fo-
cuses on forms of obligation that exist between international
actors. Specifically, whether the basis for such a relationship
exists between states (or, for that matter, at all), informs the
determination of the type of obligations that one state or indi-
vidual owes to an individual in another state.' 8 '
a. Conceptions of International Obligation
International jurisprudence centers on the philosophical
argument over whether there can be moral compulsion
outside of state borders. At one extreme, legal realists sug-
180. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme, an organi-
zation established in 1972 to promote international environmental protection
and awareness, has had mixed successes, owing in part to its inability to insti-
gate long-range, significant policy reform. LYNTON M. CALDWELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRoNmENTAL PoLIcy: EMERGENCE AND DIMENsIoNs 75-81 (1984).
However, events in the past few years suggest that environmental issues might
be attaining a more central role on the international agenda. See Lee H. Hamil-
ton, A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFFAmS, Summer 1992, at
32; Cf Emily T. Smith & Geri Smith, The Long Road From Rio, Bus. WEE ,
June 8, 1992, at 29; Environment Now International Issue, supra note 3. See
also discussion infra part V.
181. For the sake of the following discussion, the words "state" and "country"
will be used interchangeably. See also supra note 125.
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gest that moral obligation does not exist; as far as the individ-
ual state is concerned, international relationships are
entirely based on the utility of international interaction. 182
While realism might be less or more accurate as a description
of political reality with respect to certain subjects of interna-
tional relations, it does little to further a discussion about in-
ternational moral obligation in a world with an increasing
occurrence of international cooperation and sacrifice with re-
spect to environmental management issues.1 83
The existence of international moral obligation does find
a voice in less Machiavellian theories. Traditional interna-
tional law, and the lawyers and scholars that promote it, tend
towards a position of state moralism. This is the conception
of international relations that equates states to individuals,
finding the equivalent of interpersonal morality on the inter-
national plane.18 4 Following this construct, states have obli-
gations to other states to the same extent that individuals do
to other people. 8 5 As part of the logical end of the state mor-
alist theory, individuals have little role in the construct; they
are represented fully by the state, which is the only true in-
ternational actor. 86
Contrary to state-focused theorists, cosmopolitanists
base their point of view on the importance of the individual in
international relationships. They believe that the morality
182. Realists understand international relations as a system of utility
calculus based on self (i.e., the interest of the individual country) promotion.
See, e.g., Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 IN'L ORG. 485 (1988).
183. One of many examples of such international cooperation is the in-
creased coordination of environmental organizations around the world. See,
e.g., James Brooke, Oil Drilling Weighed in Peru Nature Area, N.Y. Tims, July
2, 1991, at C4.
184. See generally BRILAYER, supra note 155, at 28-34.
185. Id. For example, it would be wrong, in a normative sense, for a state to
deceive, steal, and in other ways act dishonestly within the state moralist con-
ception of international relations.
186. Thus, there are few ways that individuals may promote their own inter-
ests at the United Nations. Instead, state moralism seeks to protect the rights
of all people by promoting a system of international morality that should, theo-
retically, be reflected in the actions of the state actor domestically. See gener-
ally Peter Butler, "The Individual and International Relations," in Tim
Coin0NrNr OF STATES 115 (James Maya]l ed., 1982).
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that exists between people should not be hampered by the
existence of state boundaries. 187 To the cosmopolitanist, mo-
rality is universal; the possibility of universal rights is both
reasonable and culturally independent. 188 Therefore, while a
state moralist believes that state autonomy is a primary con-
sideration in the attainment of peaceful international rela-
tions, this deference would be insupportable to a
cosmopolitanist. Although cosmopolitanist arguments are in-
creasingly finding a forum in international law, and will be
revisited in more detail in part V below, international rela-
tions are currently ordered by concepts of state interaction.
Therefore, the rest of this part will focus on state-based
theory.
Between those that believe state borders to be primarily
impermeable, and those that understand state borders to be
mostly irrelevant, are theorists that acknowledge the world
to be composed of various political actors, including various
states, individuals, and organizations. In response to this di-
versity, these theorists recognize the need to describe com-
plex, modern, state relationships. It is for this reason that I
call such theorists "descriptivists." The descriptivists are less
concerned with locating or disparaging morality than they
are with establishing a basis for sustained political relation-
ships. Political scientists, who seek to describe quantitatively
how the institutions of international relations work, might fit
into this category.'8 9 Another group of descriptivists are
those that straddle the line between political science and law.
This group tends to search for importance in such heady no-
187. Oldenquist asserts that the important considerations in determining
morality are those of group loyalty, see supra note 157. See also Charles R.
Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHm. 591, 599 (1983).
188. Cultural relativity is a theory that holds culture to be the "sole source of
the validity of a moral right or rule." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS iN THEORY AND PRAcTIcE 109 (1989). Thus, the theory would seem to
contradict cosmopolitanism, which implies universal morality, such as that
usually supported by promoters of human rights. See also supra note 162.
189. Examples of this approach include the work of regime theorists such as
Oran Young, see, e.g., Oran Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of
International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 277 (1982), as well as game theorists such
as Robert Jervis, see, e.g., Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theory, and Coopera-
tion, 40 WORLD POL. 317 (1988).
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tions as legitimacy. 190 A slightly different group might be
called "pragmatists." These are theorists that describe inter-
national law primarily as the name for a set of institutions
that needs to exist in the modern world.191
A characteristic of descriptivists is that all of their theo-
ries acknowledge, to varying extents, that state international
obligation is at some level motivated by individual concep-
tions of appropriate behavior. While it is not always clear if
the behavior prompted by that motivation should differ if the
subject of the behavior is not a citizen of the state actor, it is
clear that there is some compulsion to act in a way that can
reasonably be described as "moral." Given some type of rec-
ognized morality, there exists the sole step of determining a
form for the morality to take with respect to international en-
vironmental relations.
Seeking the basis of international moral obligation,
Charles Beitz has argued that even if states do not always
have to act morally, this does not mean that international
morality does not exist.192 He makes an argument that moti-
vation for the international morality of states may be based
on the morality of individuals. 193 Beitz disputes the tradi-
tional reliance on a Hobbesian state of nature as a reasonable
starting point for developing a theory of international moral-
190. See, e.g., FRANCE, supra note 52. See also BRiLMAYER, supra note 155.
In her book, Professor Brilmayer promotes a theory of legitimacy she labels the
"vertical thesis." This thesis asserts that state actions with respect to nonci-
tizens are legitimate to the same extent as with citizens. Thus, any given inter-
national behavior should be analyzed within the rubric of the specific state's
governing political theory.
191. Pragmatists sometimes sound like apologists for modern international
law. A favorite argument of these writers is that because states act as though
there are international legal obligations anyway, theorists should spend more
time discussing more pressing issues. See, e.g., Henkin and D'Amato, supra
note 155. Other pragmatists hold that existing institutions should be used as
necessary to achieve the desired end (usually a search for peace); the institu-
tions' imperfections should not be obstacles to the quest for legitimate interna-
tional ends.
192. BErrz, supra note 107, at 64-66.
193. This reliance on individual morality is very unlike the metaphor that is
the basis of state moralism. Beitz's belief in individual morality as the essential
legitimating force of state behavior in many ways parallels Brilmayer's vertical
thesis. See supra note 184.
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ity.194 Instead, he accepts an international version of Rawls'
original position as the basis for international obligation.195
This theoretical model serves well as a foundation for a mod-
ern theory of intercommunity natural resource allocation.
b. Intercommunity Natural Resource Allocation
and Environmental Justice
It is a weakness of traditional international political the-
ory, Beitz suggests, that issues of allocative justice have
played only a minor role in the formal discourse.' 96 He .ar-
gues that the enormous disparities in standards of living
throughout the world necessitate that any reasonable concep-
tion of international moral responsibility must emphasize an
obligation of affluent states to transfer resources to the less
affluent.' 97 Following the argument already sketched in this
article, promoting the positive environmental management
efforts of such a community becomes part of the responsibility
of those outside of the community in question. This conclu-
sion is especially true because lack of adequate environmen-
tal management is often both a symptom and a cause of a less
affluent state's economic weaknesses.' 98
Following Rawls' lead, Beitz suggests that there is a con-
tractarian basis for the existence of an international system
of shared responsibility. He outlines an international origi-
nal position where the individuals behind the veil of igno-
rance are the self-sufficient states Rawls assumed would
gather. 9 9 At this conference the states would determine a
series of principles that define international justice in the
194. BErrz, supra note 107, at 35-50.
195. Id. at 129-36. See also discussion supra section IHA.2.
196. BErrz, supra note 107, at 127.
197. Id.
198. See Thomas H. Tietenberg, The Poverty Connection to Environmental
Policy, CHALLENGE, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 26.
199. See RAWLS, supra note 108, at 378. Rawls' conception of international
law is such that the justice produced by states (as opposed to individual people)
gathering in the original position would be one that maximized "state justice."
That is, it would be a world where "just domestic social orders might flourish."
BErrz, supra note 107, at 136. In a later chapter, Beitz expands Rawls' theory
of justice to account for individual-based international morality. Id. at 143-53.
See discussion infra section V.B.2.
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same way that individuals would determine justice in smaller
communities. 200 While the topic of entitlement to natural re-
sources is not discussed in Rawls' work, Beitz suggests that
states in this original position would find natural resource al-
location to be morally neutral.201 Thus, states behind the veil
of ignorance "would know that resources are unevenly dis-
tributed with respect to population, that adequate access to
resources is a prerequisite for successful operation of (domes-
tic) cooperative schemes, and that resources are scarce."20 2
In this situation, the states would seek allocation of those re-
sources according to Rawls' two primary principles: each
state would have equal claim to a share of the total available
natural resources, but if this allocation 0 3 of natural re-
sources would result in inequality, then an allocation must be
determined that would provide the greatest benefit of natural
resources to those least advantaged by the inequality.20 4
Rawls' and Beitz's reliance on a hypothetical original po-
sition, of course, relegates the chosen standards of justice to
the realm of speculation. The principles so derived, though,
do have both currency and legitimacy in modern interna-
tional relations. The question of allocative justice was very
much a focus of the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED),205 where many of the ar-
200. BErrz, supra note 107, at 134 (citing RAWLS, supra note 108, at 378).
201. The assertion of moral neutrality follows Rawls' claim about the distri-
bution of natural talents in individuals. Rawls finds the endowment of natural
talents to be "neither just nor unjust; ... [this distribution is] simply natural
facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these
facts." RAWLS, supra note 108, at 102.
202. BErrz, supra note 107, at 141.
203. Beitz does not attempt to describe how this distribution would be most
efficiently undertaken. Specifically, he does not discuss whether states should
get a share of the total natural resources based on population alone, if natural
resource substitution is relevant or appropriate, or if the value of the specific
natural resource to the population in question is an important variable for de-
termining this initial distribution.
204. Bsrrz, supra note 107, at 141. See also RAWLS, supra note 108, at 151.
'205. UNCED took place on June 3-14, 1992. While many specific goals were
envisioned, a central goal, with respect to aid for environmental protection, was
generally to identify the rights from which citizens of less-industrialized states
might benefit. See generally DoN HIImcHSEN, The Earth Summit, AmIcus J.,
Winter 1992, at 17.
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guments posited by those who charge industrialized countries
with engaging in neocolonialism, 206 including the proponents
of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), resur-
faced.20 7 Furthermore, in response to the important question
of from where financing for internationally dictated environ-
mental protection will come, some philosophers have pro-
posed specific methods and principles for allocating the
burden of environmental management. 208
206. See sources supra note 31.
207. The proponents of NIEO put forth their formal program in a series of
documents in the mid 1970s. These included: "Declaration on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order" (1974), "Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (1974), and "Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" (1974). See generally UNITAR
Document Service, A New International Economic Order: Selected Documents,
1945-1975 (Alfred George Moss & Harry N. M. Winton comps., 1976). See also
supra note 31.
208. For example, with respect to this challenge, the philosopher Henry
Shue has proposed the following three principles of equity:
[1.] When a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of
others by imposing costs upon them without their consent, those
who have been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to
demand that in the future the offending party shoulder burdens
that are unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage pre-
viously taken, in order to restore equality.
Henry Shue, International Justice and Global Climate 47, Address at the New
York University Law School International Jurisprudence Colloquium (April 23,
1992) (on file at Pace Envtl. L. Rev.).
[2.] Among a number of parties, all of whom are bound to contrib-
ute to some common endeavor, the parties who have the most re-
sources normally should contribute the most to the endeavor.
Id. at 57.
[3.] When some people have less than enough for a decent human
life, other people have far more than enough, and the total re-
sources available are [sufficiently] great that everyone could have
at least enough without preventing some people from still retaining
considerably more than others have, it is unfair not to guarantee
everyone at least an adequate minimum.
Id. at 67.
See also Bernard P. Herber, The Common Heritage Principle: Antarctica
and the Developing Nations, 50 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 391 (1991); JA. McNeely,
Common Property Resource Management or Government Ownership: Improv-
ing the Conservation of Biological Resources, 10 IN r'E REL. 211 (1991); A.
Marvasti, Conceptual Model for the Management of International Resources:
The Case of Seabed Minerals, 20 OcEN DxEVLopmEw & INT'L L. 273 (1989); A.
Kuflik, Allocation and Ownership of World Resources: A Symposium Overview,
23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 249 (1989).
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While the adequacy of specific models of international ob-
ligation is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to
conclude that a theory of state obligation based on, and
roughly equivalent to, the moral responsibilities of individu-
als can be formulated. Such a theory is not only possible, but
is arguably a necessary corollary in situations of strong and
growing interdependence. 2 9 Thus, the two primary motiva-
tions for a community to ensure adequate environmental
management in another community-practical necessity and
moral obligation-are both possible under a state-based ap-
proach to international relations. While descriptivists lean-
ing towards state moralism would emphasize the importance
of ensuring good relations and, ultimately, practical access to
the natural resources in question, theorists leaning more to-
wards individual rights notions of international relations
might include the increasing relevance of a moral obligation
to aid other communities as a basis for that motivation.
C. An MQE for Intercommunity Relations
This brief discussion of international obligation leads to
the conclusion that transboundary obligations may exist re-
gardless of the existence of a formal, overarching governing
body. Within the environmental context, these obligations
are best understood to be ones that ensure equitable environ-
mental management to members of communities linked by
common environmental management concerns. That is, be-
yond the pragmatic need of one community to maintain sta-
ble trade partners, there may be connections between
communities that make one community responsible for the
well-being of the other. This is a responsibility to ensure that
members of one community are not receiving a surplus of nat-
ural resources at the expense of members of another commu-
nity that are suffering from need. This element of
intercommunity justice, to an extent correlated with the re-
spective governing philosophy of each community, is already
209. See discussion infra part V for a more complete discussion of the rele-
vance of global interdependence to environmental security.
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internalized as part of community identity and thus is al-
ready part of each community's MQE.
The implication of this discussion may be summarized as
follows: if intercommunity responsibility does exist to the ex-
tent that the obligations of that responsibility are internal-
ized as part of a community's identity, then resource
allocational inequities should precipitate environmental inse-
curity in both communities. The community impoverished
with respect to natural resources will become destabilized ac-
cording to intracommunity aspects of environmental security,
while the community which is linked to the natural resource-
poor community should become destabilized because it is fail-
ing to meet the intercommunity objectives defined in its iden-
tity. This latter instability would be prompted and magnified
by factors internal and external to the community, which
would be reminders to the community that it is failing to help
promote an environmentally-just relationship.2 10
Taking into account intercommunity forces, MQE might
be further refined as follows:
The Mlinimum Quality of Environment (MQE) is the
amount and type of benefits of environmental management
that must be maintained for a given community to main-
tain its identity. This measurement reflects an effort to in-
crease the well-being of community members within that
identity by achieving community-appropriate, environ-
mentally-just environmental management; by ceding envi-
ronmental management responsibility to other
communities, when such ceding would be in the commu-
nity's best interest; and by recognizing ideals of proper in-
tercommunity obligation, including, to some extent, the
obligation to aid other communities in protecting their
environments.
210. Communities are reminded of such deficiencies by the same mecha-
nisms by which their MQEs are influenced by foreign communities. See discus-
sion supra section V.AL See also discussion supra section II.B.2. Whether
there is legal recourse for this failure is partially a function of the governing
philosophy of the community.
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This clarification of MQE emphasizes that a community's
identity is tied to intercommunity relations. Whether the in-
tercommunity aspect of identity mostly regards practical con-
cerns of maintaining intercommunity natural resource flow,
or is a result of an obligation to ensure environmental man-
agement in another community (or some combination of the
two), failure of a community to meet the challenges of this
identity can threaten environmental security.
This environmental security analysis can be used to de-
scribe many intercommunity relationships and phenomena.
In the United States, national park land is a natural resource
whose management is considered a part of the national iden-
tity.211 On the more local level, however, states often com-
pete for federal funding to maintain the quality of locally
situated national parks.212 Thus, the inability of New York
State to provide access to such parks might be understood,
within the context of New York's state-specific MQE, as a fail-
ure of the local governing body to meet the expectations of the
people of New York. This intracommunity lack of access to
national parks has caused concern and agitation that might
be understood to be an intercommunity-motivated threat to
the environmental security of both New York State and the
United States.213
There are, of course, many examples of intercommunity-
motivated threats to environmental security in international
relations. The events of the Persian Gulf War can now be
understood as precipitating a series of environmental secur-
ity threats. Iraq's incursion into Kuwait was a practical
threat to the petroleum supplies of oil-dependent countries.
The obvious vulnerability and potential of losing access to in-
expensive oil, especially for the United States,21 4 prompted
concern amongst the dependent countries' "governing bodies
211. For a discussion of the genesis and role of national parks in United
States history and culture see JOSEPH L. SAX, MouNTAin WITHOUT HANDRAILS
(1980); JOHN ISE, OuR NATIONAL PARx PoLicY: A CRmCAL HISTORY (1961).
212. See Michael Specter, City Dwellers Want U.S. Park Funds to Go East,
N.Y. TamEs, July 27, 1992, at Al.
213. Id.
214. See John C. Danforth, Not By Sanctions Alone, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
1991, at A21.
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that instability at home would result. This instability led to
the concerted action 215 that later became the war.2 16 How-
ever, beyond the practical concerns that motivated the re-
sponse to Iraq's aggression, Iraq's behavior at the close of the
war was both an intracommunity-motivated and an intercom-
munity-motivated threat to environmental security. Beyond
the intracommunity instability that the trashing of the envi-
ronment caused in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the environ-
mental security of industrialized countries, such as the
United States, was threatened. The releasing of large quan-
tities of petroleum into the Persian Gulf and the burning of
Kuwaiti oil fields by the retreating Iraqi troops created an
immediate danger to the environment of the Persian Gulf re-
gion that was condemned around the world.21 7 This environ-
mental destruction not only imperiled the trade of natural
resources from the Mideast to the rest of the world, but also
posed a threat to human life and health that seemed morally
objectionable. It is not inconceivable that if the condemned
behavior did not stop, the governing bodies of countries, even
those outside of the region, would be motivated to respond.218
To the extent that countries would, and did, respond to the
region's events which threatened the local environment, their
actions were an example of an intercommunity-motivated
threat to environmental security.
This analysis of the Persian Gulf events may apply to
other incidents of "environmental terrorism." Defying the na-
tional government and a United Nations moratorium, the
Khmer Rouge has survived in the rainforests on the Thai-
Cambodian border by decimating the forests there and selling
concessions to log the timber and mine whatever minerals
215. See Bob Hohler, N.H. National Guard Unit on Active Alert, Crisis in the
Middle East, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 1990, at 13.
216. War, one very strong reaction, is not the only possible response to
threats to environmental security. However, in some cases, military action
might be an effective way to ensure stability. This, apparently, was one goal of
the United States in the Persian Gulf.
217. See Editorial, War's Enduring Ecological Scars, L-A. Tams, Nov. 8,
1991, at B6. See also supra note 1.
218. But see Tinker, supra note 3.
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can be found in that region.21 9 This abuse of Cambodia's nat-
ural resources can be understood to be a threat not only to
Cambodia's environmental security (because Cambodia's gov-
erning body is shown not to be able to manage Cambodian
natural resources), but also to the environmental security of
all those who rely on, or support, the protection of the
Cambodian rainforests.220
Another example of an intercommunity influence that
could threaten environmental security is that associated with
the current discussion of international obligations to less-in-
dustrialized countries with respect to responding to the
threat of global climate change. A strongly articulated
message of UNCED was that as long as some nations suffer
the effects of natural resource depletion based on historically-
based disparities of power, the benefitting industrialized
countries retain an obligation to at least lessen the cost that
such a country must endure to comply with any international
treaty regime.221 As a general principle of how this obliga-
tion could be operationalized, Henry Shue has proposed with
respect to the potential cost of global climate change that
"[p]oor nations ought not to be asked to sacrifice in any way
the pace or extent of their own economic development in or-
219. See Shenon, supra note 33.
220. See id. Another example of a similar dynamic might be the results of
war-inflicted famine. As it was in the recent plight of Somalia, famine is often
more a result of inoperative political systems than of a poor growing season.
See Naser, supra note 33. When conflict causes a governing body to be unable
to provide food to the members of the community, there is bound to be instabil-
ity caused by intracommunity forces. Environmental security in other commu-
nities is threatened by intercommunity forces to the extent that members of
those other communities force their governing bodies to aid the starving mem-
bers of the famine-plagued community.
221. While the exact parameters of this responsibility shift with the re-
sources and historical facts in question, the premise of this primarily moral
claim is that because resources were taken in an exploitative way, it is imper-
missible in the context of modem international environmental trade negotia-
tion to ask less industrialized nations to sacrifice as much as those who have
benefitted from industrialization. See supra note 201. While this position
might seem strident, it is remarkably well accepted. Global treaties that have
been negotiated in the past few years often include provisions that take account
of "the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries." Vi-
enna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1985, preamble,
26 IL.M. 1529.
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der to help prevent the climate changes set in motion by the
process of industrialization that has enriched others."222 If
the moral strength of this argument gains currency, and be-
comes internalized in the identity of countries as the appro-
priate way for communities to treat each other with respect
to global environmental management, then countries will
have in effect accepted an obligation to promote environmen-
tal security.
There does seem to be one major difference between in-
tercommunity aspects of environmental security in the feder-
ated as opposed to the international context. A community
that is part of a larger, federated community shares a system
of unifying beliefs-as indicated by the existence of an in-
tercommunity governing scheme-with the other component
communities that provides the basis for intercommunity obli-
gation. This unifying context does not, and given political
and historical differences between various world commum-
ties probably cannot, exist strongly on the international level.
The lack of a recognized international governing body empha-
sizes the unique challenge of conceptualizing environmental
security on a scale larger than the domestic community.
Even given some potential for a responsibility-based ar-
gument for an obligation to ensure environmental security, it
is difficult to imagine that infractions of these intercom-
munity obligations would significantly destabilize a given lo-
cal or domestic community. While the desire for adequate
environmental management might more or less be part of the
factors that lead to social unrest, failure to aid in the environ-
mental management of needier communities probably will
not destabilize a community rich in that natural resource, re-
gardless of the responsibility it feels.2 23 This does not, how-
222. Henry Shue, The Unavoidability of Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL PoLi-
TICS OF THE ENRoNmxNT: AcToRs, INTERESTS AND INSTrrUTIONS 373, 394-95.
(Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992). Note that this principle
acts philosophically as the general rule from which the specific principles dis-
cussed in supra note 201 are derived.
223. Of course, despite the absence of motivation based entirely-on self-inter-
est, the United States did expend resources in Somalia and Ethiopia in the re-
cent past to respond to the inability of the governing bodies of those countries to
provide food to the citizenry.
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ever, mean that intercommunity aspects of environmental
security are irrelevant, or even minor. As was described
above, there are many practical reasons why the mainte-
nance of intercommunity natural resource flow is crucial to a
community's environmental security. This compulsion for in-
tercommunity obligation remains strong. It just means that
country-based moral motivation to promote the environmen-
tal security of another community remains of limited
consequence.
V. Environmental Security: The Obligation of Global
Environmental Management
Throughout this article, the possibility of a global com-
munity has suggested a subtext of considerations. If a com-
munity composed of all people exists, then, to some
unexplored extent, global environmental security would cor-
relate with a global MQE. This MQE would represent a mini-
mum quality of environmental management that every
person should be able to expect. Of course, positing a commu-
nity does not, without more, prove either its existence or the
existence of globally accepted principles of interaction with
respect to the environment. However, if phenomena charac-
teristic of community can be recognized with respect to global
environmental management, then the existence of a global
community might seem more plausible. If the participants in
global environmental relationships consider themselves part
of a single community, then the evidence appears even
stronger.
A. Conceptualizing a Global Environmental Community
If the world could be conceptualized as a single commu-
nity that has a community-specific MQE, an argument follow-
ing the reasoning in this article might suggest that there
should be no difference between the dynamic of global envi-
ronmental security and that of any other community. On fur-
ther reflection, however, it becomes apparent that a global
community would function differently, with respect to envi-
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ronmental security concerns, from any of the communities
previously discussed. This is the case for two reasons.
First, a global community would have different charac-
teristics, as a community, than any of the other communities
on which this article has focused. So far communities have
been defined, in part, by their differences with other commu-
nities.224 By contrast, the world community would include all
cultures, histories, and political theories; the traditional
boundaries of community would fail to exist. Also, because
the definition of community is premised on commonality,225
there must be some basis for believing that there is a common
set of assumptions about living in the world that would act as
the community-unifying themes. The world lacks a compre-
hensive governing body; basic principles of international rela-
tions-such as autonomy and nonintervention 226-support
separateness.227
Second, because of these differences, the global commu-
nity would be unlike any other community with respect to en-
vironmental security analysis for several reasons. The lack of
another community from which to obtain natural resources
indicates that global environmental security will have to be
conceptualized as some sort of wholly intracommunity inter-
action. Also, the lack of outside communities to exert exter-
nal influences on the community's MQE leaves a hole in the
theory of environmental security. Finally, the lack of formal
governance in the world community has at least two ramifica-
tions: the lack of governance makes environmental manage-
ment all the more difficult, and where no formal governing
body exists, there is no way to ensure accountability to the
individuals that make up the community.
224. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
225. Id.
226. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
227. This is not to say that modern international law fails to identify com-
mon needs and aspirations of states. Indeed, the United Nations Charter is a
testament to a belief in commonality. However, the belief that states have com-
mon needs is different from the assertion that all people are part of a single
community that includes a single moral obligation with respect to certain as-
pects of environmental justice and security.
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Ironically, these seeming deficiencies may be the fount
from which a comprehensive theory of environmental secur-
ity flows. If a comprehensive environmental security exists,
then it will have to reflect an understanding that the world
has limited natural resources and thus the human population
must focus on the management and just management of
those resources if it is to ensure a healthful, collective exist-
ence. 228 But does the acknowledgement of a need for coordi-
nated environmental management imply that a global
community exists? The actual existence of a global commu-
nity, following the reasoning expounded here, should be pre-
mised on a set of shared values and concerns with respect to
the management of certain natural resources. These common
concerns must, in turn, give rise to common theories of re-
sponsibility. In short, for a global environmental community
to exist, there must be a demand for and movement towards a
global environmental ethic.
B. Examining the Motivation for and the Rise of a Global
Approach to Environmental Management Problems
If the international system currently does not support
collective sacrifice for the sake of the collective good, the im-
petus for the development of a global environmental ethic
needs to be strong. In the past few years the unique nature of
international environmental management problems has
shown that certain of these problems demand a coordinated
response from a group of countries, or possibly from all coun-
tries. The potential consequences of not so responding may
be the catalyst necessary to precipitate a global evaluation of
responsibility with respect to environmental management.
Indeed, evidence of the comprehensive social inquiry that
228. The apparent limitlessness of the natural resource base has, for many
years, provided philosophers with a context in which to define and describe
property rights and, ultimately, human interaction. Locke's proviso (qualifying
his theory about the creation of private property with a dictate to ensure that
there are ample resources left for all others who likewise want to create prop-
erty) and Hobbes' theories about the economic basis for colonialism are two in-
fluential ideas that are challenged by potential limits to natural resource
abundance.
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would lead to the development of a global environmental
ethic229 may be found in some current events in international
environmental law.
1. The Singular Nature of Global Environmental
Management Problems: Why a Coordinated
Response is Necessary
While adverse effects of large-scale environmental mis-
management have been apparent for many years, the poten-
tial for damage has come into relief in the recent past. In
1986, an accident at a nuclear reactor in the town of
Chernobyl, then part of the Soviet Union, caused a release of
nuclear pollution that contaminated regions adjoining the ac-
cident site.230 The accident precipitated the modern age of
transboundary environmental concern.231 Also in the recent
past, in the mid and late 1980s, the world became aware of a
weakening in the stratospheric ozone layer over Antarctica,
and the potential effects that this development portends. 23 2
The effects of global climate change that might occur if so-
called greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere is an-
other global environmental challenge. Beyond these, and
many other possible human-made disasters, the media has
educated the world to the ravaging effects of starvation, mal-
nutrition, agricultural wasting, natural resource destruction,
and other symptoms of poverty that in part were exacerbated
229. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
230. Vincent J. Schodolski, Chernobyl: A Cancerous Legacy in Belarus, CHI.
T m., Feb. 2, 1992, at 1.
231. Many other environmental accidents, of course, have occurred that
could have had transboundary effects. In 1984, the accidental release of methyl
isocyanate from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, caused the death of some
2600 people and seriously injured 30,000-40,000 others. Union Carbide Or-
dered To Pay $193 Million To Bhopal Victims by Indian Appeals Court, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1988, at 209. Similarly, the spillage of over 10 mil-
lion gallons of petroleum from the Exxon Valdez in March of 1989 emphasized
the fragility of environmental protection systems. Lawsuits Allege Billions in
Damages From Exxon Oil Spill, Cleanup in Alaska, Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 14,
1989, at 2588.
232. See generally Warren E. Leary, Ozone-Harming Agents Reach a Record,
N.Y. TmEs, Feb. 4, 1992, at C4; Malcolm W. Browne, In Protecting the Atmos-
phere, Choices are Costly and Complex, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 7, 1989, at C1.
[Vol. 12
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by environmental mismanagement. 23 3 At the same time, it is
increasingly understood that beyond the difficulty inherent in
all environmental management problems,23 4 the multiple in-
terests and parties to global environmental decision making
would make responding to such problems particularly
difficult.
A situation in which the potential for harm is so great
and the difficulty of finding solutions so ominous would be
paralyzing if there was not hope in collective action. A coordi-
nated response to large-scale environmental management
problems is necessary because it will help to ensure that all
relevant factors are considered during problem solving to sort
out the appropriate level of response necessary,23 5 to facili-
tate agreement among the participating countries, and to es-
tablish precedent for future coordinated responses.
To assert that certain environmental management
problems require a coordinated, multinational (if not global)
response is not a radical proposition. Depending on the
threat of harm presented by a given problem, such a response
might be the most effective way of ensuring a safe future.
However, there may be situations where a coordinated re-
sponse is not in the short-term best interest of every decision
maker. Large groups of people or even entire countries might
be adverse to certain solutions that seem to necessitate mul-
tinational response and are in the world's collective best in-
terest. For example, while all nations, theoretically, would be
best served by efforts to halt global warming, the economic
burden on those countries that produce greenhouse gases as
233. See Tietenberg, supra note 192.
234. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
235. Environmental management problems are, of course, not all alike.
Some problems might be best addressed on a global level (e.g., ozone depletion
and large-scale protection of genetic diversity), others might be better ad-
dressed on a regional basis (e.g., transboundary pollution problems, certain lo-
calized trade problems, regional ecosystem management, and some natural
resource allocation problems), while still others might better be addressed on
the domestic level (e.g., traditional environmental regulation, small-scale
ecosystem management, and individual-level responses to environmental man-
agement problems).
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part of their effort towards economic growth may be great.236
It is difficult to imagine how a less-industrialized country
would be forced to retard its economic development for the
sake of a global good that it might not directly experience. 237
2. The Basis for a Global Environmental Community
The existence of a global community is easier to under-
stand in the late twentieth century, as capital, technology,
and telecommunication linkages have caused the world's peo-
ple to become increasingly interdependent. As Beitz ac-
knowledges, "[i]f social cooperation is the foundation of
distributive justice, then... international economic interde-
pendence lends support to a principle of global distributive
justice."238 This interdependence is characterized by the in-
236. Estimates of the potential cost to the United States alone for remediat-
ing global warming range from no loss to one to two percent loss of all future
economic growth. This latter figure does not include the short-term loss attrib-
utable to property damage. Mark Trumbull. Battle in the Greenhouse: Econ-
omy vs. Environment, CHmSTIN Sci. MONITOR, June 4, 1992, at 6.
237. As another example, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer surely is generally beneficial to the human population. However,
people in the United States, who will be affected by ozone depletion relatively
little (while the most injurious effects of ozone depletion will likely occur in the
higher latitudes, depletion is occurring in the lower latitudes as well, see Wil-
liam K. Stevens, Ozone Loss Over U.S. Is Found to Be Twice as Bad as Pre-
dicted, N.Y. Ti ms, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al) and may have to sacrifice economic
strength for its part of the response effort (see, e.g., Malcolm W. Browne, In
Protecting the Atmosphere, Choices are Costly and Complex, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 7,
1989, at Cl), may be less inclined to support the global effort.
238. BsNz, supra note 107, at 144.
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crease in economic relationships23 9 and institutions estab-
lished to maintain world order.240
The extent of modern interdependence suggests that
country boundaries can no longer be considered the limits to
cooperation and obligation.241 Beitz argues that Rawls' the-
ory of justice can be applied to the global community precisely
because there is a single community of obligation.2A2 Unlike
Rawls, however, Beitz suggests that because national borders
cannot be understood to be boundaries for all human interac-
tion,243 individual people should be the actors in the global
original position. He suggests that if Rawls' assumptions are
correct (and he believes that many of them are), a collection
of all people behind the global veil of ignorance would choose
239. See MAcNEaL, supra note 158, at 3-51. Participation in the community
defined by international economic relations has both benefits and costs. While
such indicators are difficult to measure accurately, global trade and capital
transfer have helped to increase the world's total economic wealth over the past
few decades. This, in turn, has resulted in economic benefits to many who
would otherwise not have so profited. At the same time, however, there are
costs of participating in an international economy. These include the possibility
that the governing body will lose some amount of local control over its commu-
nity's economy and that participation in international economic transactions
might exacerbate domestic income inequality. See generally id. See also infra
note 257 and accompanying text.
240. Participation in international affairs is increasingly regulated by insti-
tutions set up to act like governing bodies. Many of these institutions greatly
affect the distribution of natural resources in the modern world. The United
Nations, despite its many weaknesses, does exist as a governing body for those
who will accept its governance. The United Nations, which acts as a repository
of customary and formal international law, has worked to establish a set of
norms that dictate international property rights. International economic insti-
tutions (e.g., the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development), regulatory agreements (e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)) and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., through United Nations'
supported sanctions and GATT panels) similarly have profound effects on natu-
ral resource management. See CALDwxL, supra note 77, at 82-110.
241. In fact, Beitz suggests that "[in] an interdependent world, confining
principles of social justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor na-
tions so that others may benefit from living in just' regimes." Bsrrz, supra note
107, at 149-50.
242. Id. at 151-53.
243. "[I]f evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows
the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we should not view na-
tional boundaries as having fundamental moral significance." Id. at 151.
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Rawls' same structure of community justice as the basis of
global justice. 24
As Beitz makes clear, a global system of justice based on
Rawlsian principles does leave open a question of who are the
appropriate recipients of that justice. 245 A global original po-
sition inhabited by individuals would seem to suggest that
those whose position should be benefitted most should be the
globally "least advantaged" people, not the least advantaged
countries that presumably Rawls expected. Thus, because
national boundaries are not necessarily coexistent with the
least advantaged people or groups of people, it is not neces-
sarily required that a global difference principle transfer
from rich countries to poor ones as such.2 6 The most impor-
tant result of a global justice based on Rawls' principles
would be the moral compulsion to minimize allocational ine-
qualities between people, whether that reallocation be within
or between communities. 247
Beitz's suggestion that national borders should have lit-
tle significance with respect to allocational justice has great
resonance with respect to environmental management con-
cerns. If there are subjects for which national borders are not
effective boundaries, then certain environmental phenomena
surely would be appropriate examples. As was described
above, some environmental concerns can only be addressed
effectively in a supernational forum. In the past, traditional,
country-based international law has offered little guidance on
how to address these subtle and enormous issues of large-
scale environmental management. In response, a recent fo-
244. BErrz, supra note 107, at 151. See also text accompanying supra notes
107-21 for a brief outline of Rawls' framework of justice.
245. BErrz, supra note 107, at 152.
246. Id. at 153. Beitz concedes that interstate redistribution may be the sec-
ond best solution in the absence of a better strategy for satisfying a global dif-
ference principle. Id.
247. This cosmopolitanist principle has been expounded in noncontractarian
language as well. Peter Singer has suggested the universal principle that "if it
is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sac-
rificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in MopAL PHILosoPHY 597
(George Sher ed., 1987).
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cus on global environmental responsibilities has yielded new
interest in determining possible sources of international envi-
ronmental responsibility.2 48 This discourse frequently in-
cludes a decidedly cosmopolitan view of global environmental
obligation. For example, since the passage of the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Human Environment in 1972, there
has been advocacy for the recognition of a human right to a
clean environment.2 49 This right might flow from the grow-
ing human rights jurisprudence, from international legal pre-
cedent, from accepted economic guarantees, or from
international custom. 250 Whatever its legal source, however,
the right would follow from an understanding that environ-
mental mismanagement is a primary cause of poverty, star-
vation, health problems, and other injustices. 25 1
A cosmopolitan vision of global environmental responsi-
bility would not mean that all large-scale environmental
management problems should be solved in a global forum.
While it is true that some problems are primarily global in
nature, others are regional or bilateral.252 In these cases the
248. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J.
IN'L L. 529 (1993).
249. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, supra note 7, at principles 1-2.
250. See generally W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the Interna-
tional Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expan-
sion of Human Rights Norms, 3 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 85 (1990).
251. These are some of the primary concerns of the United Nations system.
See also Tietenberg, supra note 192.
252. See also supra note 229 and accompanying text. There has been a grow-
ing emphasis on determining the extent of a country's responsibility for general
environmental (as opposed to natural resource by natural resource) manage-
ment in at least three contexts. First, following the arguments of the Group of
77, international instruments were passed reaffirming individual countries'
right to exploit natural resources within their boundaries without interference
from outside forces. See, e.g., Charter of Economic and Rights and Duties of
States, GAL. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974); United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, Princi-
ple 21, at 9, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14 (1972). Second, beginning in the mid
1970s, a number of international instruments were promulgated to support en-
vironmental management in a regional and global context. See, e.g., Conven-
tion for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Mar. 23, 1981, 20
I.L.M. 746; Regional Convention for the Protection and Development of the
Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, 22 I.L.M.
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directly affected countries may be best able to negotiate a
workable solution amongst themselves. Furthermore, re-
gardless of the appropriate standard of behavior defined in a
nationless original position, many environmental manage-
ment solutions will be best effectuated by the governing bod-
ies of countries. The global environmental vision recognizes
only that the presence of an interdependent world community
implies that the interests of individuals, regardless of their
citizenship, are an important concern to all political actors
(whether people or governing entities) who attempt to act in a
morally considerate way.
3. Modern Global Environmental Equity Theory
The idea that the existence of a global community should
form the basis of moral obligation is not a new one. Even if
the discussion is limited to this century, the language of the
United Nations Charter, for example, indicates a long-stand-
ing quest to institutionalize global responsibility for the wel-
fare of all individuals, regardless of citizenship.2 53 It is only
new to extend such moral responsibility to environmental
management.
While there have been international relationships based
on environmental management for many years,254 until re-
221; World Charter for Nature, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1982). Finally, the
Brundtland Commission was charged in 1983 to examine the relationship be-
tween development and environmental protection. The report issued by that
commission (which is often referred to as the Brundtland Commission after its
chairperson, Gro Harlem Brundtland) has become a seminal work in interna-
tional environmental law. See WORLD COMISSION ON EimoNmENTAL AND DE-
VELOPMENT, UNIrED NATIONS, OuR COMMON FUTURE ix (1987) [hereinafter
Brundtland Commission Report].
253. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states that one of the purposes
of that organization is to "achieve international cooperation in solving interna-
tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N.
CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
254. Prior to the modern age of international environmental law, most inter-
national environmental treaties were concerned with migratory species of wild-
life, protection of plant life, and the incidence of transboundary pollution. See,
e.g., International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Oct. 18, 1950, 638
U.N.T.S. 186; International Plant Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, 150
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cently obligations with respect to transboundary environmen-
tal management were based exclusively on private business
transactions, treaties, or certain vague theories of customary
international law.255 Only within the past few years have
large-scale environmental management concerns become the
grist of widespread debate.
Much of the current discourse about the obligations that
exist with respect to large-scale environmental management
flows from a perceived disfunctioning of humanity's interac-
tion with the environment. Modern environmental thought
attempts to examine this relationship, to reverse some of its
more damaging behaviors, and to promote an environmental
ethic based on a more respectful and coherent relationship
between people and the Earth. This approach may be charac-
terized by three related principles: sustainable development,
intergenerational equity, and the precautionary principle.
The principles are increasingly cited as fundamental princi-
ples of international environmental law.256
Providing an economic characteristic to the nascent
global environmental ethic, sustainable development is a
modern phrase for natural resource managers' traditional no-
tion of long-term, sustainable environmental management.
Sustainable development has been defined as: "[economic]
development that meets the needs of the present without
U.N.T.S. 67; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
255. A line of cases and official statements, beginning with The Trail Smelter
Arbitration, (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.IJAA 1905 (1941), and finding voice in Principle
2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, has emphasized a
general principle that:
[s]tates have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to ex-
ploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Rio Declaration, supra note 23. See also Charney, supra note 242, at 534-42.
256. See generally Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the El-
ephant?, 84 AM. J. brrT'L L. 1 (1990). It might also be argued that access to
democratic entitlements is becoming a fourth part of this cachet. While such a
principle is not exclusively "environmental," it surely correlates with a general
theory of individual empowerment and justice. See Gormley, supra note 244.
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compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs."257 This conception of the goals of environmental
management emphasizes that economic development which
fails to account for environmental protection is bound to re-
sult in a degraded natural resource base that eventually un-
dermines economic development.258 This notion follows from
a realization that interdependence has led to a situation in
which domestic economies, and the correlated ability to pro-
tect the environment, are beholden to the collective force of
the global economy.259 Failing to alleviate this systematic
impoverishment amounts to international environmental
discrimination.
Sustainable development is premised on the principle
that each generation owes a natural resource base of at least
equal quality and magnitude to the next.260 Such an obliga-
tion is correlated with the right of each generation to inherit
such a natural resource base. This formulation, referred to
as the principle of intergenerational equity, makes impera-
tive an emphasis on long-term environmental management.
In this way, intergenerational equity is a mandate to link fu-
ture needs with past natural resource use through the re-
sponsibilities of the present generation. But such a mandate
has broader ramifications. Failing to create just environmen-
tal management in this world leaves descendants of the im-
poverished of this world in a vulnerable and unjust position.
257. Brundtland Commission Report, supra note 246, at 43.
258. Id. at 4-6. The Brundtland Commission wrote that global environmen-
tal management must address issues of economic development because less-
industrialized states are under "enormous economic pressures, both interna-
tional and domestic, to overexploit their environmental resource base." Id. at 6.
259. Beitz points to at least two ways that domestic economies might become
influenced by the global economy: "first, under prevailing political conditions,
the gains from trade and the retained profits of foreign-owned firms have
tended to be concentrated in the upper income classes; second, the political in-
fluence of foreign investors has (either directly or indirectly) supported govern-
ments committed to inegalitarian domestic distributive policies." Bsrrz, supra
note 107, at 148. See also Robert O. Keohane & Van Doom Ooms, The Multina-
tional Firm and International Regulation, 29 INtL ORG. 169, 179-80 (1975).
260. For a well-reasoned treatment of the compulsion for this obligation, also
known as intergenerational equity, see Edith Brown Weiss, supra note 74.
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A belief in intergenerational equity thus dictates a quest for
environmental justice in the present, as well as in the future.
Finally, the premise of the precautionary principle is
that even though potentially disastrous, large-scale environ-
mental management problems often contain scientific uncer-
tainty, it is necessary to establish environmental
management regimes that regulate potentially harmful activ-
ities before they are proven harmful.261 A regime governed
by the precautionary principle places the burden of proving
the harmlessness of a behavior on the party who would en-
gage in that behavior,262 and thus shifts the focus of environ-
mental management from avoidance and remediation to
planning and stewardship. Such a nontraditiona1263 ap-
proach to environmental management reflects a reassess-
ment of the efficacy of past environmental management
experience. 264
Environmental management informed by the three prin-
ciples mentioned above begins to reflect a fuller ideal of envi-
ronmental justice. This ethic is not lessened by national
borders (although countries might be the appropriate agents
for effecting necessary transfers to ensure just allocation of
261. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fun-
damental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environ-
ment, 14 B.C. IT'iL & CoNiP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1991). See generally Weintraub, supra
note 79.
262. Weintraub, supra note 79, at 204-07. Because the precautionary princi-
ple creates environmental regulation regardless of causal certainty, a potential
polluter must prove that an activity is harmless before engaging in that activ-
ity. For example, in a precautionary regime established to limit the dumping of
sewage into the ocean, a potential polluter state would have to prove to the
governing body of the regulatory system that the activity would not exceed a
predetermined standard of harm before any dumping takes place.
263. A precautionary environmental management scheme departs from
"traditional, tort-oriented approach[es] in which no harm is presumed to result
from the activity of another until a party can demonstrate damage and causa-
tion." Id. at 178, 207-09; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263, 269 (5th ed. 1984).
264. Indeed, the adoption of such an approach by some countries shows that
there are communities that highly value the benefits to be derived from envi-
ronmental protection as very high compared with the costs of remediation and
responding to unpredictable environmental disasters. There have been refer-
ences to precautionary language in numerous international legal instruments
in the past ten years. See Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 255, at 4-18.
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natural resources in this and future generations); it is well
suited to respond to the unique requirements and challenges
of international environmental management problems.265 It
envisions peoples' relationship with the Earth as one of con-
nected reliance where environmental management is conso-
nant with support for individuals' attempts to better their
own lives.266 Such treatment is not charity, it is a responsi-
bility of morally considerate actors in a world community. 2 67
That the world does recognize an obligation to ensure a mini-
mum quality of environment, as reflected in the application of
the three principles of global environmental behavior and the
development of international environmental law, is testi-
mony to the rise of a global environmental community.
C. A Comprehensive Theory of Environmental Security
The term "environmental justice" has been used in this
article as a general description of a contractarian vision of
justice defined within an environmental context. The princi-
ples that are emerging as the basis of a global environmental
ethic may be understood to be further refinements to that
general vision. By refusing to separate environmental man-
agement from human welfare, an emergent conception of en-
vironmental justice begins to indicate parameters of a
comprehensive theory of environmental security.
265. The ethic that emerges from these broad principles all support
foresightful and aggressive environmental management. This coordination is
difficult in a world composed of many different cultures, ideals, and goals. To a
large extent, then, learning to respond to problems within the context of differ-
ing goals must become the operative paradigm of international environmental
management. Mark Sagoff has argued that ecologists from differing cultures
and governmental systems should focus on their common goals rather than ex-
pend their energy in an attempt to establish a grand "unified theory." Mark
Sagoff, Ethics, Ecology, and the Environment: Integrating Science and Law, 56
TmN. L. REv. 77, 149-50 (1988).
266. In fact, global environmental treaties recently negotiated have begun to
include provisions that account for the circumstances and particular require-
ments of developing countries. See supra note 215.
267. See Singer, supra note 241, at 600.
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1. The Connection Between Environmental Justice
and Global Environmental Security
The discussion above suggests that according to modern
international environmental principles, moral actors have a
responsibility to ensure that natural resources are allocated
in a just manner and that future generations do not inherit a
degraded environment. In practice this is a responsibility to
undertake active environmental management, 268 which in
turn implies an effort to seek solutions to environmental
management problems in a manner informed by the needs of
all people affected by the policy decisions. This responsibility
is not limited by community boundaries; the environmental
context is one in which moral obligation is global.269 While
acting as a community may facilitate this moral responsibil-
ity, the responsibility arises initially to the individual alone.
Each person has an obligation to ensure an equitable quality
of environment for all needy people, regardless of location.
Unfortunately for moral individuals, however, environ-
mental management is not fungible. As has been stressed in
this article, establishing something to be a natural resource
entails a process of valuation associated with a community-
specific MQE. While the global community might exist for
the purpose of identifying certain global natural resources
and environmental management principles, the enormous di-
versity of local and domestic community identities ensures
that it would never be appropriate for the global community
to determine specific environmental management needs for
the nonglobal communities primarily discussed here. A
global theory of environmental security will have to recognize
that for the sake of environmental management, the world
community should be understood to be a special federated
system in which the needs of the component communities
268. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 79, at 197-204.
269. Singer argues that there is little moral justification, in an economically
and technologically interdependent world where people have information about
all of the planet~s ills, in limiting the scope of moral responsibility by geographi-
cal (i.e., political) boundaries. See Singer, supra note 241, at 597-98.
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must be especially respected. 270 And, like all federated sys-
tems, the MQEs that evolve amongst the various communi-
ties should reflect a division of environmental management
responsibility that most appropriately reflects the unique
needs of the citizens of the overlapping communities.2 7 1
Therefore, the individual confronted with the responsi-
bility to ensure just environmental management must look to
the community to which her or his efforts are to be focused to
discover how best that goal might be achieved. There are a
number of ways that this might be accomplished. The most
obvious way would be to determine how that community de-
fines its environmental needs (i.e., by researching and recog-
nizing the community's MQE) and to assist in the indicated
environmental management to the extent that she or he is
able.2 72 This process would allow the agent some control over
which parts of the environment would be managed, while still
focusing on those that the community in question desires. A
less burdensome possibility for the individual, and one easier
to administer, would be to send money or other aid in lieu of
services, and let the target community determine how best to
use it.273
The obligation of every individual to ensure just environ-
mental management, of course, would be internalized within
the MQE of every community, as it is within the global envi-
ronmental ethic that comprises part of all people's identity.
Thus the lines between security and identity become blurred
as one's obligation to all of her or his relevant communities is
essentially the same-to work towards ensuring that all nat-
270. This concept might be a parallel (and an evolutionary descendent) of the
traditional notion of state sovereignty that is central to modern international
law. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
271. See discussion supra section M.D.
272. Of course, the moral agent here might be represented by the governing
body of a community or an organization acting according to the agent's desires.
273. It would be too difficult here to deal with the complex issues of where to
send such money and how to judge the trustworthiness of the governing bodies
of needy communities. I only argue that a moral actor must do something, and
that second-guessing the needs of another community is neither useful (because
an outsider's ability to value another community's MQE is bound to be faulty)
nor appropriate (for many of the same reasons).
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ural resources are managed in a way most protective of those
people and communities that need them. In this way envi-
ronmental justice would be promoted through all environ-
mental management efforts.
2. A Comprehensive MQE
The global community, while sharing many characteris-
tics with other communities, is unique because of its scope
and analytical deficiencies within community analysis.
These characteristics necessitate that the world community,
for the sake of establishing a comprehensive theory of envi-
ronmental security, be particularly cognizant of the cultural
integrity and autonomy of the world's communities. That is,
when determining the ways in which to promote environnen-
tal justice, the world's environmental needs should be concep-
tualized as being determined within the context of a
federated community. This federation is the world environ-
mental community and the component communities that
serve to determine the unique needs of their members.
Environmental justice, then, may be understood to be the
catalyst of an integrated concept of environmental security.
Within this construct, the moral dictates of a global environ-
mental ethic infuse all people's relationship with their com-
munities, with other communities, and with the world
community as a whole. These differing levels of responsibil-
ity for ensuring just environmental management should be
reflected in the MQEs of the relevant communities. Thus;the
existence of a world community creates a context in which
assurance of environmental security becomes an obligation at
each level of human consciousness.
This vision of a federated world environmental commu-
nity, therefore, means that the goal of environmental security
must exist together at all community levels of human interac-
tion. Such environmental security would implicate a further
refinement in the general definition of MQE, which now could
be stated as follows:
The Minimum Quality of Environment (MQE) is the
amount and type of benefits of environmental management
1995]
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that must be maintained for a given community to main-
tain its identity. This measurement reflects an effort to in-
crease the well-being of community members within that
identity by achieving community-appropriate, environ-
mentally-just environmental management; by ceding envi-
ronmental management responsibility to other
communities, when such ceding would be in the commu-
nity's best interest; and by recognizing ideals of proper in-
tercommunity obligation, including, to some extent, the
obligation to aid other communities in protecting their en-
vironments. The existence of a global MQE implies that
every community and person has a responsibility to pro-
mote efforts to increase environmental justice.
This fully articulated MQE recognizes the centrality of the
search for justice in the quest to achieve environmental se-
curity. Justice, in this sense, includes the recognition that
communities, by definition, have unique identities and, by
recognizing the relevance of various community identities
and linking those identities to the responsibility to support
those differences, are entitled to an amount of self-definition
with respect to which of their needs must be met. A global
understanding of the relevance of MQE, therefore, teaches
the importance of diversity, and thereby supports toleration
and respect.
VI. Conclusion
The vision of environmental security sketched in this ar-
ticle would indicate a redefinition of human interaction with
the Earth. This new relationship would concentrate on
humans as both the agents and focus of environmental man-
agement. It would necessitate greater reflection on the
ramifications of natural resource use, and thus would pro-
mote diligent and critical environmental planning and natu-
ral resource use.
Furthermore, an understanding of environmental secur-
ity emphasizes that human interaction and responsibility to-
wards each other, as well as to the Earth, must become a
central concern of environmental management. Such a vision
of environmental security presages more than the effective
90http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/1
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and just responses to environmental management problems
that are necessary to the assurance of a reasonable life for all
people in a wealthy world; it suggests that a healthful life in
the modern world should be defined, at least in part, by a
global commitment to bettering the lives of others.
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